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Abstract 
The relationship between the strength of civil society and democratic survival in the interwar period has 
been much debated. Prominent studies have questioned the existence of a positive association, arguing 
that the relationship is conditioned by the level of party institutionalization. This revisionist perspective 
has been vindicated by case studies of important European cases, in particular Germany and Italy. But 
due to a lack of cross-national data, neither the direct effect of civil society nor the alternative 
perspective has so far been subjected to a comprehensive statistical analysis. In this paper we enlist 
novel data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project that enable us to carry out such an 
assessment of all democratic spells in the interwar years. Our survival analysis demonstrates that a 
vibrant civil society generally contributed to democratic survival in this period and that this effect was 
not moderated by the level of party institutionalization. 
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Introduction 
The importance of civil society for democratic stability has been emphasized since the publication of 
Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (1988[1835/1840]; see also Dahl 1961; Lederer 1940; Lipset 
et al. 1956; Kornhauser 1959). In the early 1990s, the thesis was revitalized (e.g., Putnam et al. 1993; 
Shils 1991; Cohen & Rogers 1992), leading Pérez-Díaz (1993, 40), among others, to conclude that 
democratic consolidation could only be successful in the context of a vibrant civil society.1 However, 
the notion about the propitious political effects of civil society has repeatedly been challenged (see 
Bermeo 2003, 8–15). One of the most influential objections contends that the effect of civil society on 
democratic survival is conditional on the level of political institutionalization (Huntington 1968; 
Berman 1997; Ertman 1998; Armony 2004; Riley 2010). More particularly, it has been argued that civil 
society is likely to be negative for democratic stability at low levels of party institutionalization as input 
from a vigorous associational life is apt to overwhelm the political system when it is not channeled by 
strong parties. 
This revisionist perspective has been supported by case-studies (Berman 1997; 1998; Riley 2010) 
and a more general pattern matching (Ertman 1998) within interwar Europe. But due to the lack of 
cross-national data, neither the proposition about the positive direct effect of civil society nor the 
revisionist qualification has been subjected to a comprehensive statistical analysis (cf. Berg-Schlosser & 
Mitchell 2002; Tusalem 2007; Zimmermann 1988).2 In this paper we enlist novel data from the 
Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al. 2015a) that enable us to carry out such an 
assessment of all democratic spells in the interwar years.  
We focus on the interwar period for two reasons. First, from the classical treatments of Lederer 
(1940), Kornhauser (1959), and Lipset et al. (1956, 88-89) via Huntington (1968) to a series of more 
recent contributions (Berman 1997; Ertman 1998; Riley 2010), the interwar period has been central to 
the debate about the effects of civil society on democratic survival. Second, this period, delimited by 
the twh world wars, presents relevant variation on the key variables based on a limited case universe of 
countries with democratic spells. Apart from Japan, all countries with democratic spells in these years 
were European, Latin American, or belonged to the set of former British settler colonies. The variation 
in democratic trajectories between these countries enables us to carry out systematic statistical tests of 
both the direct effect of civil society on democratic survival and of whether the relationship is 
                                                
1 The literature on civil society and democratic stability can be seen as a subset of a more general literature on the 
relationship between the advent of civil society and modern liberty (see Gellner 1994). 
2 To our knowledge, the only exception is a recent working paper by Bernhard et al. (2015), which, however, differs from 
our approach as it employs a thicker measure of democracy, a thicker measure of civil society strength (that is also based on 
indicators of freedom of association), and does not place special emphasis on the interwar period.  
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moderated by the degree of political institutionalization. Meanwhile, the limited case universe reduces 
the risk of causal heterogeneity and it means that we retain an ability to interpret these results with the 
actual country trajectories in mind.  
The interwar period is therefore the context to revisit if we wish to bring new evidence to the 
debate described above. Indeed, the entire revisionist literature is so heavily based on developments in 
interwar Europe that we would have little confidence in the empirical purchase of its expectations if 
they were not borne out by a large-n assessment of this period. 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we discuss the claim that civil society has an independent 
effect on democratic survival and the notion that this effect is moderated by the level of party 
institutionalization. Second, we subject these two propositions to survival (aka. event history) analysis 
of up to 41 countries for the period 1918–1939. The analysis shows that civil society strength decreases 
the likelihood of democratic breakdown. These results are robust to the inclusion of a number of 
potential confounders such as constitutional arrangements, socio-economic development, land 
inequality, and ethnic fractionalization. However, the analysis does not support the notion that party 
institutionalization conditions this relationship. The final section concludes. 
 
 
Civil Society and Democratic Stability: Two Positions 
With respect to the definition of civil society we generally follow Diamond (1994, 5), who 
conceptualizes it as “the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, selfgenerating, (largely) self-
supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules.” However, 
we disagree with Diamond’s last aspect, that is, the emphasis on the legal order or a set of shared rules, 
as we do not think that the specific values or behavior of the organizations should be taken into 
account. This point is important to avoid introducing selection bias, which would be the case if we for 
example excluded anti-democratic organizations (see Armony 2004; Riley 2010, 10-11). The only 
voluntary groups we exclude from the definition of civil society are therefore political parties and 
outright criminal organizations such as mafia groups.  
How does civil society, so conceived, bear upon democratic stability? The seminal treatment by 
Lipset et al. (1956) presents a forceful account of a direct, positive relationship between civil society 
and democratic stability. Lipset et al. argue that the key to the institutionalization of democracy is the 
existence of voluntary but structured subgroups that make up relatively independent centers of power 
while at the same time retaining a basic loyalty to the broader polity. Such voluntary associations serve a 
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number of functions that are vital for democracy. First, they provide and communicate new opinions to 
the citizenry. Second, they serve as an arena in which citizens become versed in politics and which 
stimulate their political participation at the national level. Third, they make up bases of political 
opposition to the powers-that-be. Lipset et al. (1956) summarize these functions in two categories: 
external functions, that is, secondary organizations opposing the power of the central body, and internal 
functions, that is, secondary associations increasing the political involvement of their members.  
These arguments are broadly similar to those presented by Putnam et al. (1993, 89–90) in their 
influential work on democracy in Italy. Putnam et al. also highlight the internal and external effects of 
civil society – but with a slight twist. That twist has to do with the external functions, which enhance 
social collaboration by articulating and aggregating interests; a point which obviously differs in 
emphasis from the ability to guard the guardians. Nonetheless, both accounts present a one-sided story 
about the auspicious effects of civil society on democracy (see Bermeo 2003, 8–11). 
These arguments are further supported by a number of classical works of social science. Both 
Lipset et al. and Putnam et al. invoke Alexis de Tocqueville’s (1988[1835/1840]) work when arguing for 
this relationship. Tocqueville’s definition of civil society differs somewhat from especially that of 
Putnam (see Welch 2006) but Tocqueville also emphasizes both the internal and external functions of 
what he took to be civil society organizations. Most important for Tocqueville is the way voluntary 
associations increase the political involvement of their members and make up barriers against 
centralization of power. These arguments are basically identical to the two set of functions that Lipset 
et al. refer to. Finally, especially Lipset et al. are also heavily endebted to the so-called “mass society” 
perspective. This perspective in a sense updates Tocqueville’s notion that modern democracy produces 
a kind of “individualism”, which makes citizens withdraw from political life and therefore stop 
presenting the necessary opposition to the centralizing aims of the powers-that-be. Following 
Tocqueville, the mass society perspective construes civil society organizations as the only way to avoid 
this atomism of modern mass society, and thereby to create a stable democracy (Lederer 1940; 
Kornhauser 1959). 
What emerges from this literature is thus the general message that a vibrant civil society creates 
a virtuous circle that stabilizes democracy to the extent that undemocratic elites and undemocratic 
social movements are unlikely to prevail. In summary, the point is that civil society creates engaged and 
vigilant citizens, who get involved politically and mobilize against transgressions of power. It follows 
that a vibrant civil society has a number of important consequences that are conducive to democratic 
stability. First, if the government attempts to centralize power in a way that threathens democracy, 
citizens will mobilize in order to fend off these initiatives. Second, pro-democratic movements and 
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parties will likewise actively mobilize and protect democracy if mass-based radical political movements 
and parties present a challenge to the political system (Lederer 1940; Kornhauser 1959; see Riley 2010, 
6-8). However, as both elites and masses would anticipate this, the most important empirical 
implications of strong civil societies are non-events; the absence of situations of political crisis of the 
kind that threaten to topple the system (Svensson 1986, 133). Furthermore, if a situation with the 
potential to produce crisis emerges, the political system will normally be able to defuse tensions in a 
peaceful and constitutional manner, even before citizens mobilize to fend off the challenges.  
A telling illustration can be found in the interwar trajectory of the United Kingdom. The United 
Kingdom had developed one of the earliest modern civil societies and throughout the interwar period 
large groups of citizens were schooled in cooporative values and political participation by partaking in 
this rich associational life. During the 1920s and 1930s, the United Kingdom experienced a series of 
potentially destabilizing situations, including a nasty spell of economic depression beginning in 1929 
and lasting well into the 1930s. But the British political system was extremely stable in the face of these 
crises. When ruptures threatened in Britain – such as during the general strike of 1926 and the political 
crisis of 1931 – large-scale violence did not erupt and strong groups mobilized to peacefully deal with 
the situation. Likewise, no anti-system parties were able to use the crises to mobilize to any significant 
degree (Mitchell 2000). In fact, even during the intense stress of World War I, the British political 
system had proved remarkably stable. As Payne (1996, 73-74) has pointed out the destructiveness of 
World War I put the political systems of all belligerents under severe pressure. But “[w]hereas the stable 
western European democratic systems were able to respond with various forms of coalition ‘national 
union’ governments, the situation deteriorated further in Central, Southern and Eastern Europe”. The 
proponents of the civil society thesis would argue that, in the context of a vibrant civil society, it was 
well-nigh impossible to establish the kinds of de facto dictatorship that other belligerents experienced. 
The counterfactual is a social order with an inherent propensity to create political conjunctures, 
whether triggered from outside events or developments inside the system. It follows that countries with 
weakly developed associational landscapes are likely to experience repeated bouts of political crisis, a 
general inability to deal with such crises in an efficient way within the rules of the democratic system, a 
significant mobilization of undemocratic political movements, and passivity on behalf of the citizens in 
the face of acts of government or non-government groups which transgress democratic rights.  
Numerous empirical examples from the interwar period could be adduced to illustrate this. In 
interwar East-Central Europe, where civil societies were notoriously weak, we thus encounter vicious 
circles of political crisis, often met by undemocratic acts of government which were passively accepted 
by the citizens, all of which in a context were undemocratic political movements were able to gather 
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substantial support and threathen the democratic system from the inside (Mann 2004). In Latin 
America we also find political systems repeatedly being toppled by crisis and extremist demands, 
without it provoking reactions in the form of substantial mobilization in order to defend the 
democratic system (Bulmer-Thomas 1987; Drake 2009). 
The first proposition that we test in this paper is thus that strong civil societies decrease the risk 
of democratic breakdown. However, the widespread praise of civil society in general and the notion 
that it is conducive to democratic stability in particular has repeatedly faced criticism (see Bermeo 2003, 
8–15). Critics have emphasized that the vibrant civil societies of interwar Germany, Austria, and 
(Northern) Italy did not hinder democratic breakdowns. Indeed, they arguably fueled the flames that 
would devour democracy. Referring back to Huntington’s (1968) seminal work on political order, 
scholars have used these cases to make the argument that civil society was not an unmitigated blessing 
for democracy in the interwar years (Berman 1997; Ertman 1998; Armony 2004; Riley 2010). 
It is not that these critics make the general claim that strong civil societies are always bad for 
democracy. Their message is that political institutionalization is needed to channel the input of an 
effervescent civil society (Berman 1997; Ertman 1998; Riley 2010). Two different dynamics drive this 
general relationship. First, a mutually reinforcing relationship – or vicious circle – where the lack of 
political institutionalization breeds political gaps which civil society steps in to fill. In the face of 
unresponsive and/or weak parties, civil society creates alternative outlets for voicing demands, a 
process that furthers political instability because these demands are not channeled through the political 
system (Berman 1997, 411–416). Second, a strong texture of voluntary associations enables non-
democratic parties to mobilize, with civil society emerging as the Trojan Horse that provides access to 
the citadel of power. The vibrant German civil society was, according to this perspective, what made it 
possible for the Nazi party to quickly mobilize a large part of German society and to spread its tentacles 
even into rural organizations (Berman 1997, 425). Likewise, it is argued that the short-lived Italian 
democracy was overwhelmed by a crisis brought about by a vibrant civil society that was not channeled 
by democratic parties and therefore left room for the mobilization of a fascist party that transcended 
politics (Riley 2010). 
The revisionist perspective is inspired by Huntington’s (1968) work on political order. 
Huntington (1968, 4) actually invokes Tocqueville (1988[1840], 517), who in Democracy in America 
pointed out that,  
 
[a]mong the laws that rule human societies, there is one which seems to be more precise 
and clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of 
 
 
8 
associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of 
conditions is increased. 
 
Huntington (1968, 198) emphatically points to Weimer Germany as an instance where this formula was 
not fulfilled, with democratic breakdown as the predictable consequence. Huntington sees Weimar 
democracy as a “mass praetorian system”, characterized by weak political institutions facing a starkly 
mobilized society. The lack of autonomy of the political system means that it is unable to mediate and 
moderate group political action: “In a praetorian system social forces confront each other nakedly; no 
political institutions, no corps of professional political leaders are recognized or accepted as the 
legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict” (Huntington 1968, 196). According to this 
argument, such a system is put in jeopardy by any increase in social mobilization, including via civil 
society. 
If correct, the revisionist perspective implies that a vibrant civil society may trigger two different 
sets of mechanisms depending on the level of political institutionalization. On the one hand, it can 
produce the set of mechanisms that works to sustain democracy and to further democratic quality via 
the internal democratic schooling and external ability to balance the powers-that-be and enhance 
societal cooperation. On the other hand, it can produce the set of mechanisms which work to 
destabilize democracy by providing input that cannot be processed by the political system and by 
creating bridgeheads for undemocratic movements to mobilize. This conditional relationship is the 
second proposition we subject to a large-N empirical examination.3 
To do so, it is first necessary to spell out what is meant by the relatively vague concept of 
political institutitonalization. We have already hinted that parties play a pivotal role in the revisionist 
literature. Huntington (1968, 12–24) uses a number of criteria based on the structuralist functionalist 
conceptual apparatus of the 1950s and 1960s to unpack political institutionalization. But he also 
provides a simpler rendering, stressing that the core of the matter has to do with the existence of strong 
parties. Berman (1997, 402, 426) singles out “strong and responsive national government and political 
parties” – or, more generally, “strong and flexible institutions, particular political parties”. Ertman 
(1998, 495) points to a more contextual specification of the same variable, namely whether “parties and 
party competition stood at the center of political life before 1914”. Riley (2010) provides an even more 
specific sequencing argument, based on whether “hegemonic politics” antedate growth in civil society. 
By hegemonic politics, he means virtually the same as Huntington does with political 
                                                
3 Notice that it differs from the claims made by several scholars about an independent effect of party institutionalization on 
democracy (see Randall & Svåsand 2002; Mainwaring 1998; Dix 1992). 
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institutionalization, i.e., the existence of strong autonomous parties (Riley 2010, 13–16). In the context 
of the interwar period, Riley’s argument therefore differs little from that of Ertman as the point is 
whether or not strong autonomous parties existed before the mass mobilization and associationalism 
unleashed by World War I.  
Among the revisionist scholars, there is thus a general consensus that it is the 
institutionalization of parties that is the most relevant aspect of political institutionalization, albeit with 
disagreement about whether it is only the present degree of party institutionalization or also legacies of 
party institutionalization that matter. In what follows, we therefore understand political 
institutionalization as party institutionalization. In line with Bernhard et al. (2015, 6), we focus on the 
organizational routinization and understand institutionalized parties to be characterized by “strong, 
stable bases of support, robust party organizations, and party labels that are distinct and valuable to 
both voters and candidates.”  We thus emphasize the parties’ organizational function (cf. Levitsky 1998, 
88; Randall and Svåsand 2002, 12).4 
 
 
Research Design and Data 
Our analysis includes all interwar (1918–1939) country-years that qualify as democratic based on a 
minimalist definition of democracy (see below) and for which we have been able to collect data. We use 
two types of estimation techniques to test our two propositions. First, we employ survival analysis. For 
the survival analyses we use the cox proportional hazards model, which is a semi-parametric duration 
model. It is appropriate for our analyses because, contrary to parametric models such as the Weibull 
model, it leaves the form of duration dependency unspecified (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 49, 
66–67). Thus, there is no assumption of a specific distribution of the baseline hazard rate. This is an 
advantage considering that in the social sciences ”strong theoretical reasons to expect one distribution 
over another” are rare (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 48). The events or failures are democratic 
breakdowns among the democracies in the sample. Tied failures are handled using the Efron method 
(Cleves et al. 2010). Standard errors are adjusted for clusters (countries). Second, we run logistic 
                                                
4 Following Randall and Svåsand (2002, 7), we argue that a distinction between party institutionalization and party system 
institutionalization is needed. When, for instance, Mainwaring & Scully (1995) identify four different dimensions of 
institutionalized party systems (i.e., regular patterns of inter-party competition, strong party roots in society, electoral and 
partisan legitimacy, and solid party organizations), they tend to conflate these concepts. This is all the more problematical 
because party system institutionalization and party institutionalization do not always converge. In other words, it is an 
empirical question whether and under what circumstances party institutionalization is conducive to party system 
institutionalization. Moreover, some features of party system institutionalization, for example inter-party competition, are 
also attributes of democracy. The examination of the impact of party system institutionalization on democracy therefore 
risks becoming tautological. We avoid this by only focusing on party institutionalization.  
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regression analyses. These analyses employ robust standard errors clustered on countries and cubic time 
polynomials (Carter and Signorino 2010). To be certain that the event occurs after the independent 
variables are measured, all the time-varying independent variables are lagged by one year in both types 
of models (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 47-67, 110-2). Our results are robust to both types of 
estimation techniques and, overall, they produce very similar results.  
 
Defining and Measuring Democracy 
To demarcate the empirical scope of the investigation, we employ a minimalist definition of democracy 
that distinguishes cases with genuinely contested elections from autocracies (see Møller & Skaaning 
2013; Przeworski et al. 2000; Schumpeter 1974[1942]). This definition is solely based on the existence 
of genuine multi-party competition for government power via recurrent elections, that it, it is shorn of 
considerations about the extent of the suffrage and the respect for civil (political) liberties (e.g., Dahl 
1989). We base our operationalization on an updated version (LIED_v2) of the Lexical Index of 
Electoral Democracy (Skaaning et al. 2015). 5  More particularly, we employ the scores for the 
competitive elections variable, which is one of the indicators that constitute this index. A score of 1 
corresponds to our minimalist conception of democracy as it signifies a situation of contested, multi-
party elections for the legislature and (directly or indirectly) the executive, while 0 corresponds to a 
situation where one or more of these criteria are not fulfilled. We use this measure both for defining 
our sample, which only includes democracies, and to demarcate instances of democratic breakdown. 
Democratic breakdown is coded as 1 the year when there is a transition from democracy to autocracy 
(the first year of autocracy according to the indicator) and 0 otherwise. There are 27 democratic 
breakdowns in the period 1918–1939 according to this measure (henceforth Lexical). As a robustness 
test we run the models with Boix et al.’s (2013) binary indicator for democracy (henceforth BMR). The 
BMR is basically based on the same operational criteria as Lexical. The only substantial difference is 
that it adds a suffrage criterion (i.e., at least half of all adult males should have voting rights). 
Nonetheless, according to the BMR measure there are only 14 democratic breakdowns in the interwar 
period. (See Online Appendix 1 Table A1 for country-years, i.e., democratic spells, included in the 
samples.)  
 
                                                
5 See https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/skaaning. Besides providing a high level of concept-measure consistency, the 
coding of this indicator is based on a more careful consultation of relevant country-specific sources than the alternatives (see 
Møller & Skaaning 2015).    
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Main Independent Variables: Civil Society Strength and Party Institutionalization 
One of the great constraints on cross-national research of political regimes in the interwar period has 
been a dearth of data. With the new data (version 5) from the V-Dem project we are able to measure 
civil society strength and party institutionalization in a fine-grained manner and with a comprehensive 
coverage of relevant country-years. The V-Dem data we employ are coded by country experts 
(generally academics with deep country-knowledge of one or more specific substantive areas). To 
minimize bias and to increase precision and cross-country eqvivalence, the data are generated based on 
the following procedure: Multiple, carefully selected country-experts (in most cases a minimum of five) 
code each country-year for every indicator. To increase the cross-country eqvivalence in measurement 
standards, many country experts carry out bridge coding (i.e., code more than one country for many 
years) and/or lateral coding (i.e., code additional countries but for one year only). The aggregation of all 
of these codings into point estimates for each indicator is based on Bayesian item response theory (IRT) 
modeling techniques that estimate latent scores based on the expert surveys. While the IRT model takes 
ordinal values as input, its output is an interval-level estimate of the given latent trait (e.g., strength of 
civil society) (see Coppedge et al. 2015a; Pemstein et al. 2015).  
To measure the strength of the civil society, we use the V-Dem indicator for CSO participatory 
environment. This variable distinguishes between different levels of engagement, ranging from 
situations where there are hardly any independent associations with voluntary participation to situations 
where many diverse civil society organizations proliferate and where it is normal that people participate 
(for the exact wording of the question, see Online Appendix 2).  
The civil society indicator does not concern the political orientation of these organizations and 
therefore registers many different types of civil society organizations. As noted above, it would bias our 
results if we only included pro-democratic organizations, as we are interested in the overall impact of 
civil society strength and not in the effects of specific types of organizations. In the V-Dem dataset, 
civil society organizations are defined as (see also Coppedge et al. 2015b, 398):  
 
... interest groups, labor unions, religiously inspired organizations (if they are engaged in 
civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, and classic non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), but not businesses, political parties, government 
agencies, or religious organizations that are primarily focused on spiritual practices. A CSO 
must also be at least nominally independent of government and economic institutions 
(Coppedge et al. 2015b, 229). 
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Figure 1 shows the trajectory of civil society strength for each one of the countries included in 
the sample. We can see that Germany receives a high score. This is what we would expect based both 
on some of the revisionist works and on other accounts of civil society strength in the interwar period. 
The high scores for Germany indicate, first, that coders have not only had pro-democratic civil society 
organizations in mind when scoring this indicator and, second, that coders have not assigned scores 
based on their knowledge of democratic developments (i.e., calculated backwards). Furthermore, the 
fact that the other relatively rich countries, such as the Northwest European countries, the Southern 
Cone countries in Latin America, and the former British settler colonies, tend to have higher scores 
than relatively less developed countries in Central America, the Andes, and the Balkans, indicates that 
our data indeed capture the relevant differences in civil society strength between countries (see Lipset 
1959; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). More generally, the differences between the country scores presented 
in the overview are in line with what we would expect based on county-specific accounts, the 
distinctions made in comparative-historical studies (see, e.g., Ertman 1998; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992), 
and dominant theories about the correlates of strong civil societies. 
 
Figure 1. Civil society strength by country in the sample  
 
Note: The figure shows the levels of civil society strength from the beginning of the first democratic spell in the 
country until the end of the last democratic spell during the period. Thus, in this figure the line is not interrupted 
when there is a breakdown within this period. Ecuador and El Salvador are included in the sample but these 
countries only have a democratic spell of one year, which is not visible in the figure. The figure is based on the 
sample from Table 1, Model 1.  
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While V-Dem only provides a single indicator on how vibrant civil society is, aspects of the 
level of party institutionalization are covered by a number of indicators, which are combined into the 
V-Dem party institutionalization index developed by Allen Hicken (see Online Appendix 2). The index 
scores consist of the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis, including five different 
components: party organizations, party branches, party linkages, distinct party platforms, and legislative 
party cohesion. The party organizations indicator captures whether the parties in the political system 
have permanent organizations. Party branches capture whether the parties have permanent local 
branches. Party linkages indicate what type of linkages parties form with their constituents, ranging 
from clientelistic to programmatic. Distinct party platforms reflect whether parties have distinct 
platforms that are publicly circulated. Legislative party cohesion measures how important party 
discipline is in the legislature. As noted by Randall and Svåsand (2002) it is not clear how different 
components of party institutionalization relate to each other. In order to examine whether the 
associations are driven by certain components, we therefore also run the same models with each of the 
components separately.  
Our main specification of party institutionalization measures levels in the interwar period, not 
levels in e.g. the period before World War I. This specification is chosen, first, because it captures the 
explanatory logic put forward by Huntington (1968) and Berman (1997), which solely focus on the 
contemporaneous interaction between civil society and party institutionalization, second, because the 
legacy of party institutionalization before World War I should also be reflected in the contemporary 
levels.  
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Figure 2. Party institutionalization by country in the sample  
 
Note: The figure shows the levels of party institutionalization from the beginning of the first democratic spell in 
the country until the end of the last democratic spell during the period. Thus, in this figure the line is not 
interrupted when there is a breakdown within this period. Ecuador and El Salvador are included in the sample 
but only has a democratic spell of one year, which is not visible in the figure. All data on this variable is missing 
for Argentina for this period and therefore not included in this sample. The figure is based on Table A6, Model 1 
in Online Appendix 1. 
 
However, as a robustness test we also run iterations where a pre-World War I specification of 
the party institutionalization variable is used. This serves to assess the “legacies” or “sequential” 
arguments of Ertman (1998) and Riley (2010), which are based on whether a high level of party 
institutionalization predated a vibrant interwar civil society. Figure 2 shows the trajectory over time for 
party institutionalization for the countries included in the sample. 
 
Control Variables 
On the right-hand side of the model, we include a number of control variables that previous research 
has attributed importance in explaining democratic survival and breakdown. To control for the level of 
economic development, we include both economic growth and a logged version of GDP/capita. We 
primarily use data from the Maddison project (Bolt & van Zanden 2014) for these variables but we 
supplement this with data from various sources for countries and/or years that are missing in the 
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Maddison project.6 As a robustness test we also run the models with the untransformed original 
Maddison data (see Online Appendix 1 Table A22). Moreover, we include binary indicators for whether 
the country was a presidential democracy or not and whether the electoral system was proportional or 
not. For presidential system we primarily use Gerring and Thacker’s (2008) classification of 
parliamentarian, presidential, and semi-presidential systems. We collapse the latter categories into a 
common category of non-parliamentarian. In case of missing data we use country specific sources to 
code them.7 For electoral system we primarily use data from Colomer (2004). Countries missing from 
this source are scored with data from Gerring and Thacker (2008) or with our own coding from 
country specific sources for a few countries.8 We include a measure of ethnic fractionalization from 
Bernhard et al. (2001).9 Further, as a robustness test we replace this coding of ethnic fractionalization 
with the Alesina et al. (2003) measure (see Online Appendix 1 Table A23). We also control for land 
inequality (cf. Moore 1966) using an interpolated version of Vanhanen’s measure of family farms 
(Vanhanen 2003). Finally, since there may be trends and diffusion effects in when democracies break 
down we include a control that measures the mean level of democracy in the region each year 
according to the Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy. We take the mean of democracy levels for all 
countries in each region for which this variable is available, which also include non-democracies 
excluded from our sample. For the models with the BMR measure, we construct a similar measure 
based on that indicator. (See Online Appendix 1 Table A2 for descriptive statistics of all variables.) 
 
 
 
                                                
6 In order to increase to the scope of the study, we have supplemented these data with figures for Estonia after 1922 from 
Klesment (2010), for Bulgaria from Ivanov (2012), and for Bolivia from Herranz-Loncán and Peres-Cajías (2015). For 
Estonia until 1922, Romania until 1925, Poland until 1928, Latvia, and Lithuania, we have used GDP/cap. estimates based 
on interpolation of figures from Bolt and van Zanden (2014), Aldcroft (2006), and  Rosés and Wolf (2008). In the cases of 
Panama and the Dominican Republic, we have used GDP/cap. estimates based on data for Colombia and El Salvador, 
respectively, and comparisons of alternative modernization indicators (infant mortality rates and urbanization) from CLIO 
Infra (see https://www.clio-infra.eu/).    
7 I.e., Romania, Bulgaria, El Salvador, Latvia, and Nicaragua. It should also be noted that on the basis of other sources (see, 
for example, Sartori 1997) we disagree with Gerring and Thacker (2008) and regard Finland as a semi-presidentail rather 
than a parliamentarian system. 
8 I.e., Romania, Bulgaria, and Nicaragua are coded based on country specific sources. The specific sources used to code the 
formal political institutions are available upen request.   
9 We have added figures of ethnic fractionalization for Romania and Yugoslavia from Eberhardt (2003). For those countries 
where figures on some years are missing in Bernhard et al. (2001) we replace missing data with the figure from the most 
recent year included in the Bernhard et al. (2001) data. 
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Empirical Analysis 
In the first step of our analysis, we investigate whether a vibrant civil society decreased the likelihood of 
democratic breakdown in the interwar years. Table 1 reports the results from these analyses. Model 1 
features a simple bivariate analysis, which indicates that civil society decreases the risk of democratic 
breakdown substantially and that this effect is statistically significant. The hazard ratio is 0.270, which 
indicates that the probability of democratic breakdown (Lexical) decreases with about 73% with every 
one-unit increase in civil society strength. The results are similar if we employ the BMR measure for 
democratic breakdown. In the bivariate analysis the probability of democratic breakdown decreases 
with about 83% with every one-unit increase in civil society strength (Table 1, model 5).  
Models 2–4 and 6–8 add several control variables to the analyses. We see that the inclusion of 
these control variables does not change the result substantially, but that the hazard ratios vary between 
the models. Depending on the controls included, the risk of democratic breakdown decreases (Lexical) 
with between 51% and 70% with each one-unit increase in civil society strength. The results also hold 
with the BMR measure for democratic breakdown where the probability of democratic breakdown 
decreases with between 83% and 92% depending on the controls included. But it should be noted that 
the BMR models include less observations than the ones employing Lexical.10  
The logit models likewise, both with Lexical and BMR, corroborate that civil society strength 
decreases the probability of democratic breakdown. The inclusion of controls does not change the 
results substantially (See Online Appendix 1 Table A3). Civil society strength thus consistently 
decreases the probability of democratic breakdown and the effect is significant in all models.11 
 
Table 1. Civil Society and Democratic Breakdown, 1918–1939  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Lexical Lexical Lexical Lexical BMR BMR BMR BMR 
Civil societyt-1 0.270*** 0.299*** 0.494* 0.427* 0.169*** 0.0802*** 0.169** 0.0850* 
 (0.0474) (0.0553) (0.159) (0.144) (0.0430) (0.0407) (0.110) (0.0968) 
         
Presidential system t-1  1.624 2.813 1.781  0.167 0.737 0.255 
  (0.937) (2.208) (1.858)  (0.169) (0.749) (1.166) 
                                                
10 The results do not change if we instead employ the original Maddison variables for GDP/capita and economic growth 
(see Online Appendix 1, Table A22, models 1–2) or if we replace the ethnic fractionalization measure with the Alesina et al. 
measure of ethnic fractionalization (See Online Appendix 1, Table A23 model 1 and 3). 
11 The logit results show that with the inclusion of controls the predicted probability of democratic breakdown (Lexical) is 
about 12% at the lowest level of civil society strength in the sample, about 1% at the mean level and about 0.5 at the highest 
level in the sample (based on Online Appendix 1 Table A3, model 4). With the BMR measure the logit results with the 
inclusion of controls show that the predicted probability of democratic breakdown is about 82% at the lowest level of civil 
society strength, only about 0.4% at the mean level and as low as 0.05 at the highest level of civil society strength in the 
sample (based on Online Appendix 1 Table A3, model 8). Predicted probabilities are calculated with margins in STATA.  
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Regional democracy 
(Lexical)t-1 
 0.680 1.727 2.331     
  (0.164) (0.518) (1.426)     
         
Regional democracy 
(BMR)t-1 
     0.0176*** 0.0809* 0.0241 
      (0.0215) (0.0931) (0.106) 
         
Log(GDP/capita) t-1   0.0190*** 0.00507*   0.100*** 0.202 
   (0.0168) (0.0107)   (0.0564) (0.297) 
         
Economic growtht-1   1.011 1.005   0.940* 0.933 
   (0.0293) (0.0370)   (0.0264) (0.0605) 
         
Proportional t-1    2.433    3.453 
    (1.356)    (5.621) 
         
Fractionalization t-1    0.688    0.0429 
    (1.015)    (0.250) 
         
Family farmst-1    1.007    1.000 
    (0.0240)    (0.0705) 
         
Number of observations 579 560 499 466 487 469 430 395 
Numbers of countries 41 41 36 34 30 30 27 25 
Number of failures 
(democratic breakdown) 27 27 21 19 14 14 11 10 
Pseudo R squared 0.186 0.204 0.312 0.377 0.265 0.371 0.430 0.515 
Log pseudolikelihood -131.2 -127.5 -84.69 -68.85 -59.46 -50.54 -35.78 -27.64 
AIC 264.4 261.0 179.4 153.7 120.9 107.1 81.55 71.28 
BIC 268.7 274.0 200.4 186.8 125.1 119.5 101.9 103.1 
Note: Cox proportional hazard models. Entries are hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses (standard errors adjusted for 
clusters). The dependent variable (failure variable) is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). AIC=Akaike Information criterion; 
BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
Figure 3 shows the estimated survival function for democracies at different levels of civil society 
strength based on the Cox model. By dividing the sample in quartiles and taking the mean of civil 
society strength in each quartile we can clearly see how the rate of survival of democracies is 
considerable lower at lower scores of civil society strength than at higher scores in the sample. This is 
true for both measures of democratic breakdown. 
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Figure 3. Civil society and democratic breakdown, 1918–1939  
  
Note: The figures show the estimated survival function at the mean values of civil society for each quartile in the sample. All other predictors are set at their 
mean. Analysis time is year. The figure to the left is based on Table 1, model 2 and the figure to the right is based on Table 1, Model 6. 
 
Turning to the control variables we can see that it does not seem to matter for democratic breakdown 
whether the system is presidential or not, whether a country has a proportional system, its degree of 
ethnic fractionalization or land inequality as measured by the degree of family farms. These variables 
are not significant in any of these models (Table 1, models 2–4, 6–8). The degree of democracy in the 
region is not significant in most models, but where it is significant it shows the expected result, i.e., that 
a higher level of democracy in the region decreases the risk of democratic breakdown (Table 1, model 
6–7). Similarly, GDP growth is only significant in one of the models and decreases the risk of 
democratic breakdown (Table 1, model 7). On the other hand, GDP/capita is significant in most 
models and decreases the probability of democratic breakdown (Table 1, models 3–4, 7).  
In sum, these results corroborate the notion that – on average – civil society bolsters the 
chances of democratic survival and that the effect of civil society is substantial.12 However, this finding 
does not rule out the potential presence of a conditional relationship. In the next step of our analysis 
we investigate whether the effects on democratic breakdown shown above are conditioned by party 
institutionalization.  
We begin by assessing whether party institutionalization in itself decreases the risk of 
democratic breakdown. It does so in a bivariate model but as we include more controls in the model 
                                                
12 If we run the analyses on a sample only including Europe and the former British settler colonies, USA, Canada, New 
Zealand, and Australia, the results are similar. Civil society strength is significantly related to democratic breakdown in seven 
out of the eight Cox models (See Online Appendix 1, Table A4). Similar models but with logit show the same results. Civil 
society strength is significantly related to democratic breakdown in six (at p<0.1 seven) out of the eight Logit models (See 
Online Appendix 1, Table A5). 
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the effect of party institutionalization becomes insignificant (see Online Appendix 1, Table A6).13 
Moreover, party institutionalization is only significant in a few (cox) models with control for civil 
society whereas civil society remains significant in all models (same models as in previous tables with 
the addition of a control for civil society) (see Online Appendix 1, Table A7). Party institutionalization 
is not significant in any of the logit models where we also control for civil society but civil society 
remains significant in all these models (see Online Appendix 1, Table A9).  
Table 2 reports the results for the interaction between civil society and party institutionalization. 
The effect of civil society on democratic breakdown does not seem to be conditioned by party 
institutionalization. 14  The interaction effect between civil society and party institutionalization is 
statistically insignificant in all models with the Lexical measure for democratic breakdown reported in 
Table 2 (Models 1–4). However, the models with the Boix et al. (2013) measure show a significant 
interaction term in some of the models but this effect becomes insignificant as we add more controls 
(Models 5–8). It should once again be noted that the BMR sample is considerable smaller than the one 
in the models using Lexical.  
                                                
13 In Logit models with BMR, party institutionalization is significant also with the inclusion of further controls (See Online 
Appendix 1, Table A8). 
14 The results do no change if we employ the original data Maddison data for GDP/capita and economic growth (see 
Online Appendix 1 Table A22, Models 3–4 and 7–8) or if the ethnic fractionalization measure is replaced by the Alesina et 
al. indicator of ethnic fractionalization (see Online Appendix 1 Table A23, Models 2 and 4).  
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Table 2. Civil Society, Party Institutionalization and Democratic Breakdown, 1918–1939 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Lexical Lexical Lexical Lexical BMR BMR BMR BMR 
Civil societyt-1 0.773 0.676 0.354 0.112* 548.8** 47.12 5.553 64.65 
 (0.687) (0.595) (0.366) (0.122) (1313.6) (139.4) (20.93) (354.2) 
         
Party institutionalization-1 0.0747 0.0595 2.979 12.79 5.500 0.142 0.0256 0.0305 
 (0.118) (0.109) (6.520) (29.40) (9.997) (0.548) (0.244) (0.257) 
         
Civil society t-1 *Party 
institutionalizationt-1 
0.264 0.317 1.703 9.639 0.00000659** 0.0000886* 0.00464 0.0000117 
 (0.320) (0.374) (2.296) (13.52) (0.0000263) (0.000393) (0.0208) (0.0000720) 
         
Presidential system t-1  0.796 3.550 1.369  0.0742 0.156 0.108 
  (0.621) (3.479) (1.635)  (0.123) (0.440) (0.551) 
         
Regional democracy 
(Lexical) t-1 
 0.957 1.857 3.919**     
  (0.282) (0.595) (1.931)     
         
Regional democracy (BMR)t-
1 
     0.177 0.0777 0.0313 
      (0.316) (0.313) (0.170) 
         
Log(GDP/capita) t-1   0.00752*** 0.000104***   0.499 22.68 
   (0.00914) (0.000229)   (1.149) (64.33) 
         
Economic growtht-1   1.015 1.025   0.935* 0.907 
   (0.0330) (0.0381)   (0.0259) (0.0670) 
         
Proportional t-1    3.492*    199.2*** 
    (1.906)    (249.8) 
         
Fractionalization t-1    0.0837    0.00614 
    (0.127)    (0.0428) 
         
Family farmst-1    0.982    1.081 
    (0.0191)    (0.0695) 
         
Number of observations 566 548 487 454 473 456 417 382 
Numbers of countries 40 40 35 33 29 29 26 24 
Number of failures (democratic 
breakdown) 
26 26 20 18 13 13 10 9 
Pseudo R squared 0.229 0.229 0.339 0.452 0.432 0.481 0.486 0.609 
Log pseudolikelihood -119.5 -118.8 -77.32 -57.27 -42.60 -38.69 -29.32 -20.04 
AIC 245.1 247.5 168.6 134.5 91.21 87.38 72.64 60.08 
BIC 258.1 269.0 198.0 175.7 103.7 108.0 100.9 99.54 
Note: Cox proportional hazard models. Entries are hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses (standard errors adjusted for 
clusters). The dependent variable (failure variable) is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). AIC=Akaike Information criterion; 
BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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The results for the models with the Lexical measure are similar for the logit models (see Online 
Appendix 1, Table A10, Models 1–4). A first glance the models with the BMR data seems to indicate a 
significant interaction even after including relevant controls (see Online Appendix 1, Table A10, 
Models 5–8). However, to fully interpret the interaction effect we need to plot the marginal effects. 
Plotting the effects it becomes clear that it is only in the BMR-model with no controls included (model 
5) that there is an effect. The models with controls included show no support for the interaction (See 
Online Appendix 1 Figure A1). 
The main findings do not change substantially when we rerun the analysis with the separate 
components of the party institutionalization index. The interactions between each of the components 
of the index and civil society strength are insignificant for most components (Table 3). Logit models 
produce similar results (see Online Appendix 1, Table A11).  
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Table 3. Civil Society, Different Components of Party Institutionalization, and Democratic Breakdown, 1918–1939 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Lexical Lexical Lexical Lexical Lexical BMR BMR BMR BMR BMR 
Civil societyt-1 0.294* 0.374* 0.487 0.340 0.511 0.0810 0.0564 0.0426* 0.0940 0.00739** 
 (0.158) (0.157) (0.216) (0.212) (0.240) (0.152) (0.142) (0.0583) (0.195) (0.0120) 
           
Party organizationt-1 2.019     0.337     
 (1.191)     (0.332)     
Party brancht-1  2.041     0.262    
  (0.809)     (0.329)    
Party linkaget-1   0.790     1.634   
   (0.283)     (2.513)   
Party platformt-1    1.268     0.730  
    (0.686)     (2.562)  
Party cohesiont-1     0.869     0.0609 
     (0.672)     (0.125) 
Civil societyt-1* Party organizationt-1 1.877*     0.339     
 (0.478)     (0.678)     
Civil societyt-1* Party brancht-1  1.230     0.227    
  (0.333)     (0.310)    
Civil societyt-1* Party linkaget-1   0.965     0.560   
   (0.272)     (0.744)   
Civil societyt-1* Party platformt-1    1.335     0.355  
    (0.657)     (0.390)  
Civil societyt-1* Party cohesiont-1     0.886     6.349 
     (0.505)     (6.084) 
           
Presidential system t-1 1.396 1.597 0.967 1.184 0.815 0.0515 0.131 0.201 0.253 7.755 
 (1.493) (1.692) (0.887) (1.423) (0.839) (0.256) (0.624) (1.622) (1.095) (19.86) 
           
Regional democracy (Lexical) t-1 4.740*** 3.604** 3.698** 3.465* 3.970*      
 (1.916) (1.721) (1.562) (1.763) (2.210)      
           
Regional democracy (BMR) t-1      0.0130 0.0128 0.0492 0.0814 0.118 
      (0.0535) (0.0682) (0.266) (0.345) (0.194) 
           
Log(GDP/capita) t-1 0.0000754*** 0.000172*** 0.00131** 0.000345** 0.000521** 6.380 62.38 0.673 3.235 8.622 
 (0.000167) (0.000353) (0.00269) (0.000915) (0.00123) (9.711) (132.5) (2.150) (15.75) (16.27) 
           
Economic growtht-1 1.032 1.024 1.011 1.015 1.020 0.915** 0.871* 0.952 0.927 0.853** 
 (0.0375) (0.0404) (0.0415) (0.0407) (0.0364) (0.0307) (0.0597) (0.106) (0.0673) (0.0515) 
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Proportional t-1 2.710 3.772* 2.934 3.638 2.079 88.56** 1536.5** 30.48*** 33.21* 123.3** 
 (2.030) (2.534) (2.370) (2.604) (2.136) (141.8) (3432.4) (23.03) (55.30) (216.8) 
           
Fractionalization t-1 0.114 0.118 0.464 0.205 0.183 0.0170 0.0123 0.00747 0.0342 19.46 
 (0.183) (0.187) (0.894) (0.365) (0.371) (0.0984) (0.0693) (0.0719) (0.233) (71.64) 
           
Family farmst-1 0.985 0.982 0.997 0.992 0.996 1.027 1.099 1.041 1.061 1.127 
 (0.0187) (0.0216) (0.0178) (0.0244) (0.0236) (0.0475) (0.0741) (0.0747) (0.0858) (0.0799) 
           
Number of observations 454 454 454 454 451 382 382 382 382 382 
Number of countries 33 33 33 33 33 24 24 24 24 24 
Number of failures (democratic breakdown) 18 18 18 18 17 9 9 9 9 9 
Pseudo R squared 0.456 0.447 0.433 0.435 0.430 0.603 0.631 0.578 0.586 0.617 
Log pseudolikelihood -56.81 -57.79 -59.25 -59.01 -56.03 -20.34 -18.90 -21.60 -21.20 -19.62 
AIC 133.6 135.6 138.5 138.0 132.1 60.68 57.80 63.20 62.39 59.23 
BIC 174.8 176.8 179.7 179.2 173.2 100.1 97.25 102.7 101.8 98.68 
Note: Cox proportional hazard models. Entries are hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses (standard errors adjusted for clusters). The dependent variable (failure variable) is democratic 
breakdown (Lexical or BMR). AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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There is one exception to this pattern. For both the survival models and the logit models with the 
Lexical measure, the interaction with the component party organization seems to be significant (Table 3, 
Model 1 and Online Appendix 1, Table A11, model 1). We therefore proceed to plot the conditional 
marginal effects based on the logit model. The graph shows clearly that there is no significant 
interaction with party organization (see Online Appendix 1, Figure A2). Likewise, while the interaction 
with party cohesion seems to be significant in the logit model with BMR (see Online Appendix 1, Table 
A11, Model 10) when we plot the conditional marginal effects there is no such significant effect (see 
Online Appendix 1, Figure A3). 
Neither the event history nor the logit results change substantially if we make the specification 
of party institutionalization more “historical” or “sequential”. Recall from the theoretical discussion 
that one current of the revisionist perspective has put forward the argument that it is not so much the 
contemporaneous levels of party institutionalization that influences the association between civil society 
and democratic survival as the legacy of prior party institutionalization (Ertman 1998) or whether such 
party institutionalization predated the growth in civil society (Riley 2010). However, iterations that 
capture this specification by measuring the pre-World War I level of party institutionalization do not 
show support for an interaction effect.1 
Finally, some would object that the revisionist thesis only concerns patterns of regime change in 
interwar Europe. Reducing the sample to European countries and the former British settler colonies 
(USA, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia) does not change the result. Even with this reduced sample, 
there is no support for an interaction effect between civil society and party institutionalization on 
democratic breakdown (see Online Appendix 1 Tables A20–21).2 In some models the interaction term 
seems to be significant but the plotted conditional marginal effects show clearly that the interaction is 
not significant in any of the models (see Online Appendix 1 Figure A4 and A5).  
 
 
                                                
1 We have run specifications where the party institutionalization variable is measured in 1905, 1910, 1913, and using an 
average for the period 1900-1913 (see Online Appendix Tables A12–A19). This appreciates Ertman (1998) legacies 
argument about the pre-World War I levels being essential and can also – in a more imperfect manner – be said to probe 
Riley’s (2010) sequential argument. The cox models with all controls and BMR with party institutionalization measured in 
the year 1910 and 1913 did not converge and are therefore not reported. STATA failed to produce robust standard errors 
for the logit model with all controls and BMR with party institutionalization measured in the year 1913 and therefore this 
model is not reported. 
2 STATA failed to produce robust standard errors for the Cox model with all controls and Lexical as dependent variable for 
the reduced sample. This model is therefore not reported. 
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Conclusions 
An important debate, centred on the interwar period, concerns the effects of civil society on 
democratic breakdown. One line of scholarship argues that civil society directly stabilizes democracy; 
another that this relationship is conditional on the level of party institutionalization – and that high 
levels of associationalism is likely to undermine democracy in certain situations. So far, these competing 
claims have not been subjected to broader empirical assessments because prior scholarship has been 
hampered by a dearth of data.  
Our analysis is thus the first to test these claims statistically based on a sample that includes all 
interwar spells of democracy (conceived in a minimalist, Schumpeterian sense), including non-
European ones. To do so, we have enlisted new data from the V-Dem project that measures the 
strength of civil society and party institutionalization in all of these instances of interwar democracy. 
The analysis shows that, in this context, a vibrant civil society was generally positively associated with a 
lower probability of democratic breakdown, and that there is no evidence that the effect is moderated 
by the degree of party institutionalization. These results are robust both to using different methods 
(event history analysis and logistic regression, respectively), to introducing different sets of relevant 
control variables, and to using different specifications of the main outcome and explanatory variables. 
 The results indicate that scholars have been too quick to generalize from the German and 
Italian interwar experiences where the negative effects of civil society have been identified by in-depth 
qualitative studies. When only analyzing a few cases in-depth one might derive perfectly correct  lessons 
about the causes of political developments in these countries, but out-of-sample generalizations might 
not be warranted, especially when the cases are not representative for the broader population (in casu, 
interwar democracies). Hence, the developments in Weimar Germany and Italy might simply be 
exceptions to a more general pattern. Qualitative scholars are normally aware of these limitations. But 
the debate about the interwar effects of civil society on democratic stability illustrate that the research 
community still has a tendency to generalize such case-specific insights insofar as they seem plausible. 
This is why it is so important to carry out more general empirical assessments.  
To what extent can these findings travel to the present era? We can start by noting that the 
immediate aftermath of the breakdown of communism in 1989–91 produced a political opening similar 
to that of 1919–1921, i.e., a massive wave of democratization piggybacking on a democratic zeitgeist 
and an international order dominated by liberal democracies. Where the situation differs is that the 
multiple interwar crises (Overy 1994; Zimmermann 1988) have had no equivalent after 1989. In 
particular, the international order has remained conducive to democratization (see also Linz 1991). But 
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were this to change, we would expect the strength of civil society to once more appear as a significant 
safeguard of democracy. We are more hesitant as to whether a high level of political institutionalization 
would, even under the strain of crisis, be needed to channeling the input of vigorous civil societies in 
the contemporary era. At least, the interwar analysis does little to sustain this expectation.   
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Online Appendix 1 
Table A1. Country Years Included in the Sample 
Country Democratic spells in 
sample (Lexical) 
Democratic breakdown 
(Lexical) 
Democratic spells in 
sample (BMR) 
Democratic breakdown 
(BMR) 
Argentina 1918-1929 1930 1918–1930 1931 
Australia 1918-1939  1918-1939  
Austria 1920-1932 1933 1920-1932 1933 
Belgium 1918-1939  1918-1939  
Bolivia 1931-1933 1934   
Bulgaria 1919 & 1931-1933 1920 & 1934   
Canada 1918-1939  1918-1939  
Chile 1918-1923 & 1932-1939 1924 1918-1924 & 1934-1939 1925 
Colombia   1937-1939  
Costa Rica 1919-1939    
Czechoslovakia 1920-1937  1919-1939  
Denmark 1918-1939  1918-1939  
Dominican 
Republic 
1924-1926 1927   
Ecuador 1934 1935   
El Salvador 1930 1931   
Estonia 1919-1933 1934 1919-1933 1934 
Finland 1919-1939  1918-1939  
France 1918-1939  1918-1939  
Germany 1919-1932 1933 1919-1932 1933 
Greece 1926-1934 1935 1926-1935 1936 
Honduras 1929-1933 1934   
Ireland 1921-1939  1922-1939  
Italy 1919-1921 1922 1919-1921 1922 
Japan 1918-1931 1932   
Latvia 1920-1933 1934 1920-1933 1934 
Lithuania 1920-1925 1926 1920-1925 1926 
Netherlands 1918-1939  1918-1939  
New Zealand 1918-1939  1918-1939  
Nicaragua 1929-1935 1936   
Norway 1918-1939  1918-1939  
Panama 1932-1935 1936   
Peru 1918 & 1931-1932 &1939 1919 & 1933   
Poland 1919-1925 1926 1919-1925 1926 
Portugal   1918-1925 1926 
Romania 1919 & 1928-1929 1920 & 1930   
South Africa 1918-1939    
Spain 1931-1935 1936 1931-1936 1937 
Sweden 1918-1939  1918-1939  
Switzerland 1918-1939  1918-1939  
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United Kingdom 1918-1939  1918-1939  
United States 1918-1939  1918-1939  
Uruguay 1918-1932 & 1938-1939 1933 1919-1933 1934 
Yugoslavia 1920-1928 1929 1921-1928 1929 
Note: The lists are based on the sample included in Table 1, Model 1 (Lexical) and Model 5 (BMR).  
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Table A2. Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations Number of 
countries 
Civil societyt-1 1.314724 1.139207 -2.297109 2.775694 579 41 
Democracy (Lexical) .9533679 .211032 0 1 579 41 
Democratic breakdown 
(Lexical) .0466321 .211032 0 1 579 41 
Democracy (BMR) .791019 .4069324 0 1 579 41 
Democratic Breakdown 
(BMR) .0138169 .1168315 0 1 579 41 
Party 
institutionalizationt-1 
.7497562 .2039506 .1036129 .9643804 566 40 
Party organizationt-1 1.30353 .8576364 -1.410434 2.854919 566 40 
Party brancht-1 1.293266 1.064875 -2.09526 2.887708 566 40 
Party linkaget-1 1.299109 1.371534 -2.919729 3.196842 566 40 
Party platformt-1 1.571486 1.014817 -2.079118 2.840981 566 40 
Party cohesiont-1 .582339 1.013448 -1.976868 2.310991 563 40 
Party 
institutionalization 
mean 1900–1913 
.7003019 .2245608 .0634703 .9400966 484 34 
Party 
institutionalization 1905 
.6933001 .2396529 .0634703 .9400966 469 33 
Party 
institutionalization 1910 
.7249067 .2107754 .0634703 .9400966 484 34 
Party 
institutionalization 1913 
.7305724 .215859 .0634703 .9400966 484 34 
Presidential system t-1 .3357143 .4726618 0 1 560 41 
Regional democracy 
(lexical) t-1  
4.006275 1.10303 0 5.190476 579 41 
Regional democracy 
(BMR) t-1 
.5788349 .3329281 0 .9 578 41 
Log(GDP/capita)t-1 8.019246 .5213858 6.677083 9.063672 568 41 
Economic growtht-1 1.387952 7.166434 -22.42546 26.63518 516 36 
Proportional t-1 .5892857 .4924033 0 1 560 41 
Fractionalization t-1 .2896203 .2503985 .0104582 .8945445 577 40 
Family farmst-1 38.73142 21.80558 1 84 506 37 
Note: Based on the sample in Table 1, model 1. 
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Table A3. Civil Society and Democratic Breakdown 1918–1939 (Logit) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Lexical Lexical Lexical Lexical BMR BMR BMR BMR 
Civil societyt-1 0.491*** 0.522*** 0.628* 0.489* 0.337*** 0.150*** 0.217** 0.130** 
 (0.0792) (0.0921) (0.134) (0.137) (0.0818) (0.0844) (0.119) (0.0888) 
         
Presidential system t-1  1.364 1.652 1.631  0.107 0.265 0.272 
  (0.618) (0.961) (1.214)  (0.125) (0.341) (0.592) 
         
Regional democracy (lexical)t-1  0.827 1.161 1.636     
  (0.158) (0.309) (0.767)     
         
Regional democracy (BMR)t-1      0.246 0.392 0.106 
      (0.320) (0.550) (0.266) 
         
Log(GDP/capita) t-1   0.105** 0.0477+   0.824 1.641 
   (0.0912) (0.0781)   (0.476) (2.766) 
         
Economic growtht-1   1.010 1.009   0.933 0.911+ 
   (0.0337) (0.0401)   (0.0419) (0.0495) 
         
Proportional t-1    2.891    4.969 
    (1.871)    (6.780) 
         
Fractionalization t-1    7.094    0.0653 
    (8.866)    (0.197) 
         
Family farmst-1    1.013    1.020 
    (0.0183)    (0.0453) 
         
t 1.294+ 1.325+ 1.261 1.512+ 0.970 0.770 0.598 0.955 
 (0.181) (0.194) (0.191) (0.351) (0.478) (0.396) (0.314) (0.747) 
         
t2 0.984+ 0.983+ 0.989 0.978 1.058 1.106+ 1.118+ 1.061 
 (0.00912) (0.00956) (0.00994) (0.0156) (0.0540) (0.0669) (0.0712) (0.0877) 
         
t3 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.998 0.996+ 0.996+ 0.998 
 (0.000166) (0.000174) (0.000180) (0.000271) (0.00151) (0.00194) (0.00208) (0.00242) 
         
Constant 0.0469*** 0.0716** 413852.5* 5215578.0 0.00768*** 0.0299** 0.220 0.000272 
 (0.0275) (0.0669) (2511981.3) (56395391.2) (0.00945) (0.0392) (0.990) (0.00405) 
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Number of observations 579 560 499 466 487 469 430 395 
Numbers of countries 41 41 36 34 30 30 27 25 
Pseudo R squared 0.160 0.170 0.219 0.286 0.317 0.389 0.396 0.460 
Log pseudolikelihood -91.69 -89.86 -68.01 -56.67 -43.39 -38.48 -30.94 -25.19 
AIC 193.4 193.7 154.0 137.3 96.78 90.96 79.87 74.38 
BIC 215.2 224.0 191.9 187.1 117.7 120.0 116.4 122.1 
Note: Dependent variable is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). Logit models. Table entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors clustered by countries in parentheses. t=years 
of regime duration. AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A4. Civil Society and Democratic Breakdown 1918–1939 (Only Settler Colonies and Europe)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Lexical Lexical Lexical Lexical BMR BMR BMR BMR 
Civil societyt-1 0.186*** 0.139*** 0.431* 0.644 0.144*** 0.0864** 0.175* 0.0233* 
 (0.0476) (0.0596) (0.152) (0.342) (0.0383) (0.0702) (0.155) (0.0426) 
         
Presidential system t-1  0.183 2.364 1.176  0.124 0.219 0.0495 
  (0.275) (3.550) (2.089)  (0.299) (0.548) (0.318) 
         
Regional democracy 
(lexical)t-1 
 0.335** 0.777 0.735     
  (0.131) (0.459) (0.388)     
         
Regional democracy 
(BMR)t-1 
     0.0286 0.445 0.339 
      (0.0526) (1.411) (0.864) 
         
Log(GDP/capita) t-1   0.0201** 0.00000324**   0.0774*** 0.270 
   (0.0303) (0.0000127)   (0.0600) (0.471) 
         
Economic growtht-1   0.993 0.992   0.938 0.865** 
   (0.0679) (0.0521)   (0.0361) (0.0473) 
         
Proportional t-1    17.49    45.43*** 
    (26.03)    (26.63) 
         
Fractionalization t-1    0.00000745    0.00419 
    (0.0000502)    (0.0299) 
         
Family farmst-1    0.910***    1.072* 
    (0.0225)    (0.0324) 
         
Number of observations 933 429 387 356 849 428 389 357 
Numbers of countries 31 27 24 23 29 26 23 22 
Number of failures 
(democratic breakdown) 18 14 10 9 13 11 8 7 
Pseudo R squared 0.236 0.357 0.413 0.713 0.282 0.373 0.433 0.626 
Log pseudolikelihood -90.56 -52.14 -33.76 -14.76 -60.24 -39.60 -25.91 -14.94 
AIC 183.1 110.3 77.52 45.52 122.5 85.19 61.82 45.89 
BIC 188.0 122.5 97.32 76.52 127.2 97.37 81.64 76.91 
Note: Cox proportional hazard models. Entries are hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses (standard errors adjusted for clusters). The 
dependent variable (failure variable) is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * p 
< 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A5. Civil Society and Democratic Breakdown 1918–1939 (Only Settler Colonies and Europe, Logit models)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Lexical Lexical Lexical Lexical BMR BMR BMR BMR 
Civil societyt-1 0.354*** 0.345*** 0.457** 0.513 0.308*** 0.103* 0.207 0.0212*** 
 (0.104) (0.0936) (0.124) (0.238) (0.0886) (0.119) (0.179) (0.00930) 
         
Presidential system t-1  0.235 0.492 0.0569  0.0157 0.0952 0.0463* 
  (0.271) (0.561) (0.159)  (0.0478) (0.259) (0.0708) 
         
Regional democracy (lexical) t-1  0.811 1.031 2.947     
  (0.216) (0.539) (1.889)     
         
Regional democracy (Boix) t-1      1.469 1.337 13.24 
      (2.448) (2.854) (59.55) 
         
Log(GDP/capita) t-1   0.154 0.00000195   0.437 0.0507 
   (0.255) (0.0000151)   (0.412) (0.0869) 
         
Economic growtht-1   1.022 1.006   0.901 0.750* 
   (0.0968) (0.0752)   (0.0708) (0.0957) 
         
Proportional t-1    16.10    115.7** 
    (26.52)    (180.1) 
         
Fractionalization t-1    0.0650    0.00207 
    (0.244)    (0.0105) 
         
Family farmst-1    0.928    1.234*** 
    (0.0731)    (0.0722) 
         
t 1.442* 1.094 0.646 14.04 1.761 0.628 0.467 0.277 
 (0.252) (0.506) (0.517) (37.75) (0.633) (0.340) (0.248) (0.436) 
         
t2 0.985* 1.036 1.096 0.888 0.989 1.167* 1.181** 1.251 
 (0.00735) (0.0598) (0.110) (0.176) (0.0298) (0.0868) (0.0758) (0.232) 
         
t3 1.000* 0.998 0.996 1.001 1.000 0.994* 0.994** 0.992 
 (0.0000528) (0.00183) (0.00315) (0.00451) (0.000788) (0.00253) (0.00217) (0.00577) 
         
Constant 0.0189*** 0.0916* 127055.0 1.13107e+37 0.00179*** 0.00860* 14.03 2071.8 
 (0.0178) (0.111) (1422674.2) (5.90943e+38) (0.00249) (0.0198) (81.75) (29310.4) 
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Number of observations 954 429 387 356 873 428 389 357 
Numbers of countries 31 27 24 23 29 26 23 22 
Pseudo R squared 0.251 0.304 0.338 0.599 0.313 0.445 0.453 0.675 
Log pseudolikelihood -66.85 -42.94 -30.75 -16.83 -46.43 -28.39 -21.33 -11.20 
AIC 143.7 99.89 79.51 57.67 102.9 70.77 60.67 46.40 
BIC 168.0 128.3 115.1 104.2 126.7 99.19 96.34 92.94 
Note: Dependent variable is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). Logit models. Table entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors clustered by countries in parentheses. t=years of regime 
duration. AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A6. Party Institutionalization and Democratic Breakdown, 1918–1939 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Lexical Lexical Lexical Lexical BMR BMR BMR BMR 
Party 
institutionalization-1 0.00653
*** 0.0170* 3.996 22.89 0.000518*** 0.000145*** 0.00384 0.00441 
 (0.00975) (0.0297) (9.604) (58.05) (0.000747) (0.000264) (0.0144) (0.0244) 
         
Presidential system t-1  0.879 4.973 1.126  0.639 0.908 0.453 
  (0.634) (4.592) (1.606)  (0.482) (0.909) (1.170) 
         
Regional democracy 
(Lexical) t-1  0.671 1.708 3.910
*     
  (0.224) (0.653) (2.674)     
         
Regional democracy 
(BMR)t-1      0.0469
** 0.0800 0.143 
      (0.0468) (0.117) (0.319) 
         
Log(GDP/capita) t-1   0.00352*** 0.0000597***   0.0936* 0.102 
   (0.00352) (0.000109)   (0.108) (0.204) 
         
Economic growtht-1   1.010 1.019   0.908* 0.894* 
   (0.0318) (0.0317)   (0.0443) (0.0439) 
         
Proportional t-1    2.502    3.601 
    (1.851)    (5.981) 
         
Fractionalization t-1    0.0683    0.858 
    (0.105)    (2.212) 
         
Family farmst-1    0.976    0.995 
    (0.0244)    (0.0304) 
         
Number of observations 566 548 487 454 473 456 417 382 
Numbers of countries 40 40 35 33 29 29 26 24 
Number of failures 
(democratic breakdown) 26 26 20 18 13 13 10 9 
Pseudo R squared 0.123 0.131 0.308 0.403 0.167 0.234 0.341 0.376 
Log pseudolikelihood -135.8 -134.0 -80.90 -62.33 -62.52 -57.10 -37.54 -31.95 
AIC 273.7 274.0 171.8 140.7 127.0 120.2 85.09 79.89 
BIC 278.0 286.9 192.7 173.6 131.2 132.6 105.3 111.5 
Note: Cox proportional hazard models. Entries are hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses (standard errors adjusted for clusters). The 
dependent variable (failure variable) is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * p 
< 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A7. Party Institutionalization and Democratic Breakdown with Control for Civil Society, 1918–1939 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Lexical Lexical Lexical Lexical BMR BMR BMR BMR 
Party 
institutionalization-1 0.0454
* 0.0412 3.052 14.81 0.0589 0.000980* 0.000402 0.000808 
 (0.0694) (0.0766) (6.845) (36.50) (0.125) (0.00295) (0.00305) (0.00628) 
         
Civil societyt-1 0.332*** 0.325*** 0.495* 0.492** 0.233*** 0.0968*** 0.129* 0.0308* 
 (0.0772) (0.0755) (0.160) (0.133) (0.0849) (0.0617) (0.124) (0.0436) 
         
Presidential system t-1  0.719 3.510 1.652  0.0427* 0.0916 0.191 
  (0.556) (3.391) (2.064)  (0.0620) (0.221) (0.698) 
         
Regional democracy 
(Lexical) t-1  0.898 1.857 3.738
*     
  (0.260) (0.588) (2.069)     
         
Regional democracy 
(BMR) t-1      0.0161
** 0.0133 0.0128 
      (0.0209) (0.0416) (0.0561) 
         
Log(GDP/capita) t-1   0.00872*** 0.000282***   0.932 11.21 
   (0.00958) (0.000542)   (1.820) (35.12) 
         
Economic growtht-1   1.014 1.022   0.919*** 0.887** 
   (0.0337) (0.0423)   (0.0134) (0.0408) 
         
Proportional t-1    2.761    66.76*** 
    (1.650)    (82.82) 
         
Fractionalization t-1    0.153    0.133 
    (0.222)    (0.578) 
         
Family farmst-1    0.990    1.059 
    (0.0221)    (0.0430) 
         
Number of observations 566 548 487 454 473 456 417 382 
Numbers of countries 40 40 35 33 29 29 26 24 
Number of failures 
(democratic breakdown) 26 26 20 18 13 13 10 9 
Pseudo R squared 0.222 0.225 0.338 0.440 0.294 0.439 0.469 0.583 
Log pseudolikelihood -120.5 -119.5 -77.41 -58.49 -52.97 -41.83 -30.25 -21.34 
AIC 245.0 246.9 166.8 135.0 109.9 91.67 72.50 60.68 
BIC 253.7 264.1 192.0 172.0 118.3 108.2 96.70 96.19 
Note: Cox proportional hazard models. Entries are hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses (standard errors adjusted for clusters). 
The dependent variable (failure variable) is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian 
information criterion. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A8. Party Institutionalization and Democratic Breakdown (Logit), 1918–1939 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Lexical Lexical Lexical Lexical BMR BMR BMR BMR 
Party Institutionalizationt-1 0.0765 0.184 1.948 8.643 0.0399* 0.0212** 0.0207* 0.00111* 
 (0.106) (0.255) (3.961) (19.51) (0.0583) (0.0296) (0.0405) (0.00361) 
         
Presidential system t-1  1.173 2.006 1.165  0.589 0.660 0.417 
  (0.526) (1.506) (1.272)  (0.299) (0.378) (0.415) 
         
Regional democracy (Lexical)t-1  0.755 1.118 2.092     
  (0.126) (0.314) (0.940)     
         
Regional democracy (BMR)t-1      0.575 0.722 0.135 
      (0.502) (0.747) (0.286) 
         
Log(GDP/capita) t-1   0.0379** 0.00310***   0.547 0.604 
   (0.0392) (0.00416)   (0.685) (0.852) 
         
Economic growtht-1   1.006 1.003   0.912 0.883 
   (0.0348) (0.0394)   (0.0553) (0.0603) 
         
Proportional t-1    3.106    1.705 
    (2.506)    (1.989) 
         
Fractionalization t-1    1.967    0.613 
    (2.641)    (1.517) 
         
Family farmst-1    0.982    1.031 
    (0.0188)    (0.0356) 
         
t 1.310 1.332 1.335 1.760* 0.912 0.985 0.716 1.534 
 (0.215) (0.212) (0.207) (0.496) (0.543) (0.600) (0.483) (1.206) 
         
t2 0.980 0.979* 0.982 0.964 1.053 1.044 1.076 0.998 
 (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0101) (0.0194) (0.0646) (0.0637) (0.0720) (0.0791) 
         
t3 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001 0.998 0.998 0.997 0.999 
 (0.000185) (0.000188) (0.000178) (0.000341) (0.00174) (0.00169) (0.00187) (0.00222) 
         
Constant 0.197* 0.283 490166657.8** 1.34338e+15*** 0.101 0.213 37.79 27.20 
 (0.143) (0.261) (3.19017e+09) (1.15326e+16) (0.140) (0.293) (336.0) (267.3) 
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Number of observations 566 548 487 454 473 456 417 382 
Numbers of countries 40 40 35 33 29 29 26 24 
Pseudo R squared 0.131 0.139 0.220 0.303 0.247 0.261 0.325 0.384 
Log pseudolikelihood -91.67 -90.08 -65.11 -52.82 -44.81 -43.62 -31.84 -26.25 
AIC 193.3 194.2 148.2 129.6 99.63 101.2 81.67 76.50 
BIC 215.0 224.3 185.9 179.1 120.4 130.1 118.0 123.8 
Note: Dependent variable is democratic breakdown (lexical or BMR). Logit models. Table entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors clustered by countries in parentheses. t=years of regime 
duration. AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A9. Party Institutionalization and Democratic Breakdown with Control for Civil Society (Logit), 1918–1939 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Lexical Lexical Lexical Lexical BMR BMR BMR BMR 
Party Institutionalizationt-1 0.201 0.272 2.699 31.67 2.328 0.567 0.0514 0.247 
 (0.284) (0.369) (5.279) (72.42) (5.239) (1.516) (0.217) (1.092) 
         
Civil Society-1 0.536*** 0.541*** 0.617* 0.430* 0.322** 0.114** 0.168* 0.0399** 
 (0.0954) (0.1000) (0.143) (0.149) (0.121) (0.0911) (0.130) (0.0438) 
         
Presidential system t-1  1.003 1.926 2.676  0.0419 0.0707 0.111 
  (0.461) (1.449) (3.475)  (0.0678) (0.148) (0.312) 
         
Regional democracy (Lexical)t-1  0.883 1.246 2.383     
  (0.165) (0.355) (1.200)     
         
Regional democracy (BMR)t-1      0.326 0.304 0.195 
      (0.471) (0.651) (0.656) 
         
Log(GDP/capita) t-1   0.0524** 0.00314***   2.119 10.83 
   (0.0588) (0.00428)   (2.819) (38.97) 
         
Economic growtht-1   1.012 1.016   0.929 0.895 
   (0.0359) (0.0469)   (0.0454) (0.0831) 
         
Proportional t-1    5.742**    93.86 
    (3.826)    (230.1) 
         
Fractionalization t-1    6.739    0.104 
    (10.41)    (0.455) 
         
Family farmst-1    1.003    1.058 
    (0.0228)    (0.0550) 
         
t 1.366* 1.378* 1.299 1.755* 0.777 0.557 0.634 0.735 
 (0.209) (0.214) (0.195) (0.499) (0.419) (0.340) (0.625) (1.118) 
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t2 0.980* 0.980* 0.986 0.969 1.092 1.167* 1.147 1.148 
 (0.00966) (0.00999) (0.0103) (0.0199) (0.0633) (0.0838) (0.107) (0.186) 
         
t3 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001 0.996* 0.994* 0.995 0.995 
 (0.000167) (0.000176) (0.000182) (0.000339) (0.00173) (0.00225) (0.00272) (0.00487) 
         
Constant 0.0988** 0.127 26880806.9* 4.72319e+13*** 0.00626* 0.0477 0.000460 9.92e-13 
 (0.0829) (0.144) (194745950.8) (4.25226e+14) (0.0132) (0.0911) (0.00411) (2.85e-11) 
         
Number of observations 566 548 487 454 473 456 417 382 
Numbers of countries 40 40 35 33 29 29 26 24 
Pseudo R squared 0.181 0.184 0.244 0.364 0.347 0.438 0.448 0.558 
Log pseudolikelihood -86.43 -85.39 -63.07 -48.18 -38.86 -33.22 -26.03 -18.85 
AIC 184.9 186.8 146.1 122.4 89.72 82.44 72.07 63.69 
BIC 210.9 221.2 188.0 175.9 114.7 115.4 112.4 115.0 
Note: Dependent variable is democratic breakdown (lexical or BMR). Logit models. Table entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors clustered by countries in parentheses. t=years of regime 
duration. AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A10. Civil Society, Party Institutionalization and Democratic Breakdown, 1918–1939 (Logit)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Lexical Lexical Lexical Lexical BMR BMR BMR BMR 
Civil Society-1 1.069 1.018 0.629 0.158 20.32 25.25 37.83 2234.7* 
 (0.748) (0.719) (0.538) (0.187) (33.60) (73.12) (93.47) (8200.5) 
         
Party Institutionalizationt-1 0.293 0.403 2.713 38.98 56.30 159.2 26.36 0.0000414 
 (0.404) (0.513) (4.989) (95.52) (144.5) (771.5) (164.5) (0.000275) 
         
Civil society t-1 *Party institutionalizationt-1 0.334 0.364 0.971 4.548 0.00147* 0.000186* 0.000109* 6.21e-09* 
 (0.337) (0.368) (1.112) (6.770) (0.00409) (0.000794) (0.000439) (4.94e-08) 
         
Presidential system t-1  1.108 1.928 2.592  0.0429 0.0381 0.00465* 
  (0.536) (1.430) (3.407)  (0.0925) (0.114) (0.0113) 
         
Regional democracy (Lexical)t-1  0.928 1.247 2.482     
  (0.184) (0.353) (1.237)     
         
Regional democracy (BMR)t-1      4.539 2.704 0.00855 
      (9.479) (7.198) (0.0270) 
         
Log(GDP/capita) t-1   0.0527* 0.00133***   2.342 33804.3 
   (0.0637) (0.00266)   (3.847) (212835.7) 
         
Economic growtht-1   1.012 1.020   0.939 0.850** 
   (0.0358) (0.0452)   (0.0419) (0.0507) 
         
Proportional t-1    6.801**    1925.7* 
    (4.955)    (6182.0) 
         
Fractionalization t-1    4.144    0.00751 
    (6.931)    (0.0395) 
         
Family farmst-1    0.998    1.205* 
    (0.0220)    (0.106) 
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t 1.326 1.339 1.298 1.815* 0.748 0.256* 0.126+ 0.129 
 (0.204) (0.211) (0.193) (0.493) (0.426) (0.170) (0.153) (0.393) 
         
t2 0.982 0.981 0.986 0.969 1.103 1.287** 1.365* 1.439 
 (0.00977) (0.0101) (0.0103) (0.0192) (0.0715) (0.116) (0.204) (0.559) 
         
t3 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001 0.996 0.991** 0.990* 0.988 
 (0.000167) (0.000177) (0.000182) (0.000328) (0.00213) (0.00302) (0.00473) (0.0121) 
         
Constant 0.0957** 0.0972* 25688764.1* 1.77022e+16** 0.00111* 0.00140 0.000148 7.87e-37 
 (0.0785) (0.100) (199993077.8) (2.28586e+17) (0.00319) (0.00694) (0.00138) (3.87e-35) 
         
Number of observations 566 548 487 454 473 456 417 382 
Numbers of countries 40 40 35 33 29 29 26 24 
Pseudo R squared 0.186 0.188 0.244 0.370 0.407 0.491 0.506 0.657 
Log pseudolikelihood -85.89 -84.99 -63.07 -47.74 -35.31 -30.05 -23.32 -14.63 
AIC 185.8 188.0 148.1 123.5 84.63 78.10 68.65 57.25 
BIC 216.2 226.7 194.2 181.1 113.7 115.2 113.0 112.5 
Note: Dependent variable is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). Logit models. Table entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors clustered by countries in parentheses. t=years of regime 
duration. AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A11. Civil Society, Different Components of Party Institutionalization, and Democratic Breakdown, 1918–1939 (Logit) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Lexical Lexical Lexical Lexical Lexical BMR BMR BMR BMR BMR 
Civil Society-1 0.333* 0.369* 0.499 0.411 0.500* 0.103** 0.0678 0.00407** 0.000000162 0.00113*** 
 (0.147) (0.185) (0.188) (0.262) (0.161) (0.0761) (0.196) (0.00838) (0.00000167) (0.00220) 
           
Party organizationt-1 3.095     0.394     
 (1.963)     (0.505)     
Party brancht-1  1.817     2.078    
  (0.710)     (4.951)    
Party linkaget-1   0.895     88.08   
   (0.266)     (260.4)   
Party platformt-1    1.468     0.0183  
    (0.875)     (0.0890)  
Party cohesiont-1     0.673     0.0187 
     (0.479)     (0.0382) 
Civil societyt-1* Party organizationt-
1 
1.637*     0.312     
 (0.405)     (0.399)     
Civil societyt-1* Party brancht-1  1.116     0.000844    
  (0.350)     (0.00365)    
Civil societyt-1* Party linkaget-1   0.889     0.215   
   (0.187)     (0.202)   
Civil societyt-1* Party platformt-1    0.912     5.49e-08  
    (0.302)     (0.000000532)  
Civil societyt-1* Party cohesiont-1     0.856     9.096* 
     (0.286)     (7.878) 
           
Presidential system t-1 2.986 2.035 1.368 2.097 0.961 0.0684 0.0000227* 0.0159** 2.42e-21 0.159 
 (4.040) (2.141) (1.212) (2.506) (0.994) (0.249) (0.000109) (0.0251) (7.63e-20) (0.539) 
           
Regional democracy (Lexical)t-1 3.435* 2.395 2.601* 2.310 2.421*      
 (1.761) (1.083) (1.173) (1.065) (0.972)      
           
Regional democracy (BMR)t-1      0.0421 0.0303 0.0122 3.46e-17 0.621 
      (0.195) (0.154) (0.0327) (8.58e-16) (1.922) 
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Log(GDP/capita) t-1 0.000398*** 0.00279** 0.0120*** 0.0109** 0.0105*** 29.69 359861.1 0.0591 8.96932e+24 3148.4 
 (0.000865) (0.00510) (0.0159) (0.0166) (0.0141) (99.55) (2925375.1) (0.281) (3.58748e+26) (14928.8) 
           
Economic growtht-1 1.025 1.017 1.009 1.009 1.011 0.882 0.872** 0.957 0.857* 0.842* 
 (0.0432) (0.0455) (0.0453) (0.0456) (0.0455) (0.0644) (0.0381) (0.0669) (0.0618) (0.0708) 
           
Proportional t-1 6.280* 6.142** 4.343* 4.844* 3.128 161.0* 58660.0* 191.9 2.63290e+14 2362.2* 
 (4.499) (4.222) (2.922) (3.519) (2.604) (394.3) (288631.5) (560.7) (6.17301e+15) (8772.1) 
           
Fractionalization t-1 10.78 5.339 11.21 7.829 10.63 0.0474 0.0000992 0.000000840* 5.52e-31 10.47 
 (17.46) (9.338) (15.38) (13.27) (20.89) (0.201) (0.000468) (0.00000504) (2.42e-29) (52.43) 
           
Family farmst-1 1.007 1.003 1.017 1.012 1.018 1.081* 1.209 1.085 2.000 1.178** 
 (0.0260) (0.0205) (0.0158) (0.0185) (0.0187) (0.0389) (0.136) (0.0577) (0.854) (0.0586) 
           
t 1.959* 1.802* 1.688 1.687 1.717 0.395 0.0115 0.0761 0.00635 1.116 
 (0.621) (0.515) (0.572) (0.513) (0.661) (0.553) (0.0588) (0.206) (0.0222) (2.325) 
           
t2 0.966 0.968 0.972 0.971 0.971 1.216 2.133 1.466 4.847 1.252 
 (0.0213) (0.0204) (0.0229) (0.0205) (0.0248) (0.200) (1.452) (0.466) (4.950) (0.222) 
           
t3 1.001 1.001 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.993 0.974 0.987 0.942 0.990 
 (0.000366) (0.000352) (0.000393) (0.000347) (0.000412) (0.00498) (0.0214) (0.00962) (0.0358) (0.00498) 
           
Constant 7.49602e+19** 6.23417e+14** 1.39018e+10** 3.50525e+10* 7.23523e+10** 3.34e-15 8.43e-48 1.78591e+09 9.93e-203 1.07e-39* 
 (1.05543e+21) (7.97275e+15) (1.19792e+11) (3.72460e+11) (6.57552e+11) (8.63e-14) (5.63e-46) (7.30905e+10) (3.20e-200) (4.67e-38) 
           
Number of observations 454 454 454 454 451 382 382 382 382 382 
Numbers of countries 33 33 33 33 33 24 24 24 24 24 
Pseudo R squared 0.388 0.360 0.351 0.352 0.338 0.578 0.711 0.606 0.764 0.615 
Log pseudolikelihood -46.37 -48.45 -49.16 -49.09 -47.96 -18.01 -12.32 -16.79 -10.08 -16.42 
AIC 120.7 124.9 126.3 126.2 123.9 64.01 48.64 61.59 44.15 60.85 
BIC 178.4 182.5 184.0 183.8 181.5 119.2 95.98 116.8 91.50 116.1 
Note: Dependent variable is democratic breakdown (lexical or BMR). Logit models. Table entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors clustered by countries in parentheses. t=years of regime 
duration. AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A12. Civil Society, Party Institutionalization Legacies (mean 1900–1913) and Democratic Breakdown, 1918–1939 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Lexical Lexical Lexical Lexical BMR BMR BMR BMR 
Civil societyt-1 0.613 0.706 0.558 0.463 25.71 0.0547 0.958 30777472.8 
 (0.510) (0.648) (0.552) (0.642) (78.37) (0.384) (11.37) (317115821.7) 
         
Party institutionalization mean 
1900–1913 0.0992 0.399 8.132 41.42 0.420 0.000171 0.000868 8.38e-13
** 
 (0.154) (0.701) (16.90) (131.2) (1.297) (0.000943) (0.00444) (7.57e-12) 
         
Civil society t-1 * Party 
institutionalization mean 1900–
1913 
0.285 0.237 0.687 1.358 0.000275 1.033 0.0117 3.16e-22* 
 (0.331) (0.312) (0.848) (2.746) (0.00146) (9.410) (0.205) (7.81e-21) 
         
Presidential system t-1  1.954 5.213 1.957  0.0357 0.112 0.0000108 
  (1.698) (5.313) (3.266)  (0.0938) (0.245) (0.0000963) 
         
Regional democracy (Lexical)t-1  0.728 1.574 3.495     
  (0.242) (0.516) (2.336)     
         
Regional democracy (BMR)t-1      0.00172 0.00420 9.15e-09* 
      (0.00844) (0.0204) (7.73e-08) 
         
Log(GDP/capita) t-1   0.00588*** 0.000114***   0.893 1.32913e+10* 
   (0.00747) (0.000269)   (0.773) (1.23735e+11) 
         
Economic growtht-1   1.027 1.043   0.908 0.685*** 
   (0.0358) (0.0362)   (0.0590) (0.0669) 
         
Proportional t-1    1.873    2.04060e+10* 
    (1.846)    (2.04413e+11) 
         
Fractionalization t-1    0.0767    8.61e-10 
    (0.126)    (1.45e-08) 
         
Family farmst-1    0.983    1.217** 
    (0.0308)    (0.0781) 
         
Number of observations 484 467 429 420 389 373 358 347 
Numbers of countries 34 34 31 30 23 23 22 21 
Number of failures (democratic 
breakdown) 22 22 18 17 9 9 8 8 
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Pseudo R squared 0.244 0.253 0.390 0.464 0.470 0.599 0.651 0.817 
Log pseudolikelihood -97.52 -95.83 -63.34 -52.33 -27.11 -20.36 -15.76 -8.246 
AIC 201.0 201.7 140.7 124.7 60.22 50.73 45.52 36.49 
BIC 213.6 222.4 169.1 165.1 72.11 70.34 72.69 74.98 
Note: Cox proportional hazard models. Entries are hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses (standard errors adjusted for clusters). The dependent variable (failure variable) is 
democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A13. Civil Society, Party Institutionalization Legacies (1905) and Democratic Breakdown, 1918–1939 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Lexical Lexical Lexical Lexical BMR BMR BMR BMR 
         
Civil societyt-1 0.472 0.626 0.546 0.592 1.301 0.0214 0.446 0.0881 
 (0.374) (0.530) (0.501) (0.752) (2.018) (0.160) (3.122) (0.226) 
         
Party institutionalization 1905 0.138 0.625 11.96 86.10 0.202 0.000325 0.00110 0.000000113** 
 (0.204) (1.008) (23.20) (274.4) (0.642) (0.00175) (0.00506) (0.000000593) 
         
Civil society t-1 * Party institutionalization 1905 0.406 0.269 0.729 1.055 0.0249 4.719 0.0378 0.00391 
 (0.447) (0.333) (0.817) (1.976) (0.0706) (45.41) (0.367) (0.0270) 
         
Presidential system t-1  2.410 5.462 1.970  0.0654 0.113 0.0710 
  (2.104) (5.282) (3.222)  (0.140) (0.227) (0.361) 
         
Regional democracyt-1  0.679 1.523 3.755*  0.00216 0.00360 0.0000118 
  (0.231) (0.510) (2.503)  (0.0104) (0.0143) (0.0000919) 
         
Log(GDP/capita) t-1   0.00528*** 0.0000770***   0.781 1506.1*** 
   (0.00666) (0.000176)   (0.608) (3218.2) 
         
Economic growtht-1   1.028 1.048   0.911* 0.856*** 
   (0.0355) (0.0365)   (0.0388) (0.0371) 
         
Proportional t-1    1.629    3818.4** 
    (1.581)    (10062.7) 
         
Fractionalization t-1    0.0689    0.00802 
    (0.111)    (0.0799) 
         
Family farmst-1    0.978    1.142*** 
    (0.0305)    (0.0341) 
         
Number of observations 469 452 429 420 374 359 358 347 
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Numbers of countries 33 33 31 30 22 22 22 21 
Number of failures (democratic breakdown) 21 21 18 17 8 8 8 8 
Pseudo R squared 0.244 0.259 0.394 0.471 0.477 0.597 0.646 0.757 
Log pseudolikelihood -92.87 -90.45 -62.91 -51.64 -23.75 -18.17 -15.98 -10.95 
AIC 191.7 190.9 139.8 123.3 53.51 46.33 45.96 41.89 
BIC 204.2 211.5 168.3 163.7 65.28 65.75 73.12 80.38 
Note: Cox proportional hazard models. Entries are hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses (standard errors adjusted for clusters). The dependent variable (failure variable) is 
democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A14. Civil Society, Party Institutionalization Legacies (1910) and Democratic Breakdown, 1918–1939 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Lexical Lexical Lexical Lexical BMR BMR BMR 
Civil societyt-1 0.796 0.695 0.742 0.493 1375.2 0.462 230.1 
 (0.704) (0.658) (0.828) (0.805) (7085.4) (4.282) (2748.9) 
        
Party institutionalization 1910 0.0482 0.0733 2.247 14.19 0.610 0.000306 0.000869 
 (0.0808) (0.179) (6.427) (52.24) (1.941) (0.00212) (0.00346) 
        
Civil society t-1 * Party institutionalization 1910 0.196 0.238 0.376 0.963 0.000000670 0.0405 0.00000172 
 (0.240) (0.321) (0.534) (2.229) (0.00000580) (0.513) (0.0000320) 
        
Presidential system t-1  1.071 4.136 2.253  0.0378 0.0921 
  (1.211) (5.584) (4.307)  (0.0991) (0.157) 
        
Regional democracy (Lexical)t-1  0.816 1.696 3.072    
  (0.301) (0.567) (2.163)    
        
Regional democracy (BMR)t-1      0.00576 0.0128 
      (0.0325) (0.0483) 
        
Log(GDP/capita) t-1   0.00790*** 0.000241**   1.889 
   (0.0105) (0.000624)   (2.208) 
        
Economic growtht-1   1.024 1.034   0.887 
   (0.0352) (0.0368)   (0.0702) 
        
Proportional t-1    2.243    
    (2.068)    
        
Fractionalization t-1    0.106    
    (0.200)    
        
Family farmst-1    0.994    
    (0.0320)    
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Number of observations 484 467 429 420 389 373 358 
Numbers of countries 34 34 31 30 23 23 22 
Number of failures (democratic breakdown) 22 22 18 17 9 9 8 
Pseudo R squared 0.265 0.267 0.385 0.453 0.524 0.608 0.667 
Log pseudolikelihood -94.83 -94.02 -63.87 -53.42 -24.35 -19.90 -15.00 
AIC 195.7 198.0 141.7 126.8 54.71 49.80 44.00 
BIC 208.2 218.8 170.2 167.3 66.60 69.41 71.17 
Note: Cox proportional hazard models. Entries are hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses (standard errors adjusted for clusters). The dependent variable (failure variable) is 
democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A15. Civil Society, Party Institutionalization Legacies (1913) and Democratic Breakdown, 1918–1939 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Lexical Lexical Lexical Lexical BMR BMR BMR 
Civil societyt-1 0.812 0.690 0.749 0.504 917.3 2.634 348.1 
 (0.714) (0.649) (0.842) (0.822) (3569.8) (27.97) (2500.7) 
        
Party institutionalization 1913 0.0447 0.0523 2.249 14.71 0.602 0.000925 0.000518* 
 (0.0749) (0.134) (6.591) (55.00) (1.802) (0.00764) (0.00197) 
        
Civil society t-1 * Party institutionalization 1913 0.190 0.238 0.369 0.929 0.00000155* 0.00298 0.00000112 
 (0.231) (0.319) (0.530) (2.146) (0.0000100) (0.0442) (0.0000120) 
        
Presidential system t-1  0.946 4.141 2.281  0.0362 0.0646 
  (1.123) (5.684) (4.405)  (0.0957) (0.119) 
        
Regional democracy (Lexical)t-1  0.848 1.694 3.070    
  (0.323) (0.569) (2.173)    
        
Regional democracy (BMR)t-1      0.0175 0.0198 
      (0.114) (0.0637) 
        
Log(GDP/capita) t-1   0.00791*** 0.000239**   3.627 
   (0.0107) (0.000620)   (3.997) 
        
Economic growtht-1   1.024 1.034   0.895* 
   (0.0353) (0.0369)   (0.0505) 
        
Proportional t-1    2.239    
    (2.045)    
        
Fractionalization t-1    0.107    
    (0.200)    
        
Family farmst-1    0.994    
    (0.0320)    
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Number of observations 484 467 429 420 389 373 358 
Numbers of countries 34 34 31 30 23 23 22 
Number of failures (democratic breakdown) 22 22 18 17 9 9 8 
Pseudo R squared 0.269 0.271 0.385 0.453 0.541 0.620 0.682 
Log pseudolikelihood -94.27 -93.54 -63.87 -53.42 -23.47 -19.30 -14.34 
AIC 194.5 197.1 141.7 126.8 52.95 48.60 42.69 
BIC 207.1 217.8 170.2 167.3 64.84 68.21 69.85 
Note: Cox proportional hazard models. Entries are hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses (standard errors adjusted for clusters). The dependent variable (failure variable) is 
democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A16. Civil Society, Party Institutionalization Legacies (mean 1900–1913) and Democratic Breakdown (Logit), 1918–1939 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Lexical Lexical Lexical Lexical BMR BMR BMR BMR 
Civil societyt-1 0.873 0.848 0.683 0.233 1.628 0.232 8.501 1.54189e+10 
 (0.556) (0.561) (0.531) (0.249) (3.086) (1.749) (36.98) (6.44295e+11) 
         
Party institutionalization 
mean 1900–1913 0.346 0.640 7.101 64.70 1.599 0.523 0.0139 1.36e-80 
 (0.474) (0.889) (19.90) (220.2) (5.055) (4.587) (0.0773) (2.43e-78) 
         
Civil society t-1 * Party 
institutionalization mean 
1900–1913 
0.414 0.462 0.712 3.512 0.0690 0.319 0.000429 4.23e-70 
 (0.409) (0.490) (0.792) (5.315) (0.236) (3.212) (0.00334) (9.85e-68) 
         
Presidential system t-1  1.289 2.945 2.928  0.0367 0.000882** 3.80e-81 
  (0.760) (3.413) (4.508)  (0.0741) (0.00229) (1.02e-78) 
         
Regional democracy 
(Lexical)t-1  0.846 1.223 2.472     
  (0.175) (0.379) (1.392)     
         
Regional democracy (BMR)t-
1      0.277 0.236 6.05e-113 
      (1.872) (0.655) (1.97e-110) 
         
Log(GDP/capita) t-1   0.0317* 0.000974*   41.05*** 3.11302e+25 
   (0.0547) (0.00287)   (45.73) (2.34657e+27) 
         
Economic growtht-1   1.025 1.040   0.918 0.596 
   (0.0377) (0.0442)   (0.0413) (0.451) 
         
Proportional t-1    5.327*    3.34305e+55 
    (4.514)    (5.99229e+57) 
         
Fractionalization t-1    6.452    4.43e-24 
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    (13.62)    (3.91e-22) 
         
Family farmst-1    0.997    77.39 
    (0.0337)    (433.5) 
         
t 1.214 1.241 1.242 1.917* 0.621 0.361 0.204 0.000000163 
 (0.188) (0.201) (0.206) (0.536) (0.382) (0.480) (0.383) (0.00000441) 
         
t2 0.985 0.984 0.989 0.965 1.110 1.215 1.402 121.6 
 (0.0111) (0.0117) (0.0122) (0.0203) (0.0833) (0.166) (0.349) (900.9) 
         
t3 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001 0.996 0.993 0.987 0.831 
 (0.000196) (0.000208) (0.000211) (0.000341) (0.00233) (0.00418) (0.00814) (0.234) 
         
Constant 0.114** 0.119 579754280.7 1.54630e+17* 0.0145 0.176 9.66e-13*** 1.83e-177 
 (0.0876) (0.134) (6.23692e+09) (3.05931e+18) (0.0320) (0.882) (7.99e-12) (1.01e-174) 
         
Number of observations 484 467 429 420 389 373 358 347 
Numbers of countries 34 34 31 30 23 23 22 21 
Pseudo R squared 0.198 0.203 0.286 0.391 0.406 0.509 0.590 0.815 
Log pseudolikelihood -71.80 -70.72 -53.32 -43.33 -25.40 -20.84 -15.70 -7.046 
AIC 157.6 159.4 128.6 114.7 64.81 59.67 53.41 30.09 
BIC 186.9 196.8 173.3 171.2 92.55 94.96 96.09 60.89 
Note: Dependent variable is democratic breakdown (lexical or BMR). Logit models. Table entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors clustered by countries in parentheses. t=years of regime 
duration. AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A17. Civil Society, Party Institutionalization Legacies (1905) and Democratic Breakdown (Logit), 1918–1939 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Lexical Lexical Lexical Lexical BMR BMR BMR BMR 
Civil societyt-1 0.665 0.652 0.612 0.297 0.592 0.760 2.150 14.95 
 (0.367) (0.375) (0.410) (0.270) (0.750) (2.654) (4.527) (390.9) 
         
Party institutionalization 
1905 0.431 0.841 9.308 158.9 1.720 0.708 0.0137 4.52e-33 
 (0.556) (1.086) (24.69) (496.0) (4.902) (3.950) (0.0692) (2.68e-31) 
         
Civil society t-1 * Party 
institutionalization mean 
1905 
0.610 0.671 0.881 2.879 0.310 0.0607 0.00378 1.41e-26 
 (0.519) (0.621) (0.870) (3.892) (0.750) (0.307) (0.0149) (1.35e-24) 
         
Presidential system t-1  1.320 3.153 3.136  0.0160*** 0.00107*** 5.02e-35 
  (0.813) (3.492) (4.625)  (0.0195) (0.00222) (5.02e-33) 
         
Regional democracy 
(Lexical)t-1  0.800 1.219 2.839     
  (0.178) (0.375) (1.686)     
         
Regional democracy (BMR)t-
1      0.349 0.163 2.08e-45 
      (1.202) (0.397) (2.26e-43) 
         
Log(GDP/capita) t-1   0.0267* 0.000497**   34.38*** 1.27981e+17 
   (0.0469) (0.00134)   (34.09) (3.89953e+18) 
         
Economic growtht-1   1.027 1.043   0.921 0.741 
   (0.0374) (0.0436)   (0.0406) (0.214) 
         
Proportional t-1    5.206*    2.77276e+24 
    (4.262)    (1.76890e+26) 
         
Fractionalization t-1    7.743    5.68e-18 
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    (17.65)    (1.90e-16) 
         
Family farmst-1    0.992    4.787 
    (0.0366)    (9.180) 
         
t 1.185 1.212 1.245 2.072* 0.606 0.325 0.242 0.000233 
 (0.197) (0.213) (0.208) (0.668) (0.435) (0.379) (0.350) (0.00239) 
         
t2 0.986 0.985 0.989 0.960 1.109 1.249 1.375 10.59 
 (0.0125) (0.0134) (0.0123) (0.0223) (0.0939) (0.176) (0.260) (29.27) 
         
t3 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001 0.996 0.992 0.988 0.913 
 (0.000223) (0.000239) (0.000209) (0.000369) (0.00257) (0.00452) (0.00619) (0.0966) 
         
Constant 0.113** 0.136 1.70228e+09 8.26324e+18* 0.0155* 0.209 2.70e-12*** 1.12e-125 
 (0.0842) (0.157) (1.87484e+10) (1.51473e+20) (0.0295) (0.632) (1.96e-11) (2.53e-123) 
         
Number of observations 469 452 429 420 374 359 358 347 
Numbers of countries 33 33 31 30 22 22 22 21 
Pseudo R squared 0.209 0.217 0.289 0.405 0.410 0.516 0.583 0.782 
Log pseudolikelihood -67.83 -66.56 -53.08 -42.37 -22.81 -18.56 -15.96 -8.304 
AIC 149.7 151.1 128.2 112.7 59.62 55.12 53.92 34.61 
BIC 178.7 188.1 172.8 169.3 87.09 90.07 96.61 69.25 
Note: Dependent variable is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). Logit models. Table entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors clustered by countries in parentheses. t=years of regime 
duration. AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A18. Civil Society, Party Institutionalization Legacies (1910) and Democratic Breakdown (Logit), 1918–1939 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Lexical Lexical Lexical Lexical BMR BMR BMR 
Civil societyt-1 1.156 1.090 0.988 0.341 7.494 0.514 20.19 
 (0.856) (0.830) (0.930) (0.500) (20.19) (3.899) (75.87) 
        
Party institutionalization 
1910 0.225 0.335 2.967 7.922 1.609 1.024 0.0228 
 (0.349) (0.528) (8.281) (28.00) (5.491) (10.03) (0.113) 
        
Civil society t-1 * Party 
institutionalization mean 
1910 
0.266 0.304 0.382 1.470 0.00648 0.100 0.0000867 
 (0.300) (0.365) (0.511) (2.939) (0.0303) (1.024) (0.000610) 
        
Presidential system t-1  1.110 2.455 2.662  0.0394 0.000292* 
  (0.667) (2.896) (4.508)  (0.0707) (0.000960) 
        
Regional democracy 
(Lexical)t-1  0.886 1.275 1.999    
  (0.178) (0.406) (1.052)    
        
Regional democracy (BMR)t-
1      0.478 0.413 
      (3.309) (0.881) 
        
Log(GDP/capita) t-1   0.0469* 0.00492*   65.18** 
   (0.0675) (0.0133)   (89.54) 
        
Economic growtht-1   1.023 1.031   0.920* 
   (0.0373) (0.0439)   (0.0376) 
        
Proportional t-1    4.821    
    (4.069)    
        
Fractionalization t-1    6.672    
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    (14.82)    
        
Family farmst-1    1.011    
    (0.0278)    
        
t 1.206 1.225 1.229 1.674 0.650 0.337 0.144 
 (0.190) (0.201) (0.203) (0.469) (0.364) (0.456) (0.265) 
        
t2 0.987 0.986 0.988 0.972 1.100 1.223 1.489 
 (0.0112) (0.0118) (0.0123) (0.0211) (0.0734) (0.178) (0.389) 
        
t3 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.997 0.993 0.985 
 (0.000197) (0.000210) (0.000218) (0.000357) (0.00205) (0.00454) (0.00871) 
        
Constant 0.144* 0.162 55000393.0* 6.59103e+12 0.0171 0.118 2.27e-14** 
 (0.117) (0.185) (491734027.1) (1.19762e+14) (0.0393) (0.706) (2.31e-13) 
        
Number of observations 484 467 429 420 389 373 358 
Numbers of countries 34 34 31 30 23 23 22 
Pseudo R squared 0.208 0.210 0.282 0.369 0.420 0.511 0.605 
Log pseudolikelihood -70.92 -70.09 -53.61 -44.91 -24.81 -20.74 -15.15 
AIC 155.8 158.2 129.2 117.8 63.62 59.48 52.30 
BIC 185.1 195.5 173.9 174.4 91.37 94.77 94.98 
Note: Dependent variable is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). Logit models. Table entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors clustered by countries in parentheses. t=years of regime 
duration. AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A19. Civil Society, Party Institutionalization Legacies (1913) and Democratic Breakdown (Logit), 1918–1939 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Lexical Lexical Lexical Lexical BMR BMR BMR 
        
Civil societyt-1 1.158 1.085 0.990 0.352 8.036 0.606 15.01 
 (0.819) (0.785) (0.923) (0.513) (22.21) (4.273) (49.84) 
        
Party institutionalization 
1913 0.214 0.291 2.869 7.932 1.517 1.212 0.0121 
 (0.325) (0.453) (8.120) (28.46) (5.155) (11.97) (0.0625) 
        
Civil society t-1 * Party 
institutionalization mean 
1913 
0.265 0.304 0.380 1.391 0.00583 0.0812 0.000128 
 (0.286) (0.348) (0.501) (2.737) (0.0279) (0.762) (0.000810) 
        
Presidential system t-1  1.058 2.433 2.686  0.0397* 0.000134* 
  (0.643) (2.903) (4.601)  (0.0652) (0.000463) 
        
Regional democracy 
(Lexical)t-1  0.899 1.276 1.999    
  (0.180) (0.407) (1.060)    
        
Regional democracy (BMR)t-
1      0.570 0.407 
      (3.950) (0.828) 
        
Log(GDP/capita) t-1   0.0475* 0.00494   110.8** 
   (0.0689) (0.0135)   (166.6) 
        
Economic growtht-1   1.023 1.031   0.924* 
   (0.0373) (0.0440)   (0.0346) 
        
Proportional t-1    4.795    
    (4.017)    
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Fractionalization t-1    6.734    
    (15.01)    
        
Family farmst-1    1.012    
    (0.0278)    
        
t 1.208 1.226 1.228 1.672 0.662 0.332 0.140 
 (0.193) (0.203) (0.203) (0.468) (0.363) (0.456) (0.256) 
        
t2 0.987 0.986 0.988 0.972 1.097 1.224 1.516 
 (0.0112) (0.0118) (0.0123) (0.0212) (0.0714) (0.184) (0.396) 
        
t3 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.997 0.993 0.985 
 (0.000197) (0.000210) (0.000218) (0.000357) (0.00200) (0.00477) (0.00874) 
        
Constant 0.145* 0.168 51736668.1* 6.34850e+12 0.0175 0.103 4.20e-16** 
 (0.110) (0.188) (466803597.6) (1.16284e+14) (0.0403) (0.636) (4.67e-15) 
        
Number of observations 484 467 429 420 389 373 358 
Numbers of countries 34 34 31 30 23 23 22 
Pseudo R squared 0.210 0.212 0.282 0.369 0.422 0.512 0.612 
Log pseudolikelihood -70.69 -69.91 -53.61 -44.92 -24.75 -20.68 -14.86 
AIC 155.4 157.8 129.2 117.8 63.49 59.36 51.73 
BIC 184.7 195.1 173.9 174.4 91.24 94.66 94.41 
Note: Dependent variable is democratic breakdown (lexical or BMR). Logit models. Table entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors clustered by countries in parentheses. t=years of regime 
duration. AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A20. Civil Society, Party Institutionalization and Democratic Breakdown, 1918–1939 (Reduced sample Europe and Settler Colonies)  
 (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Lexical Lexical Lexical BMR BMR BMR BMR 
Civil societyt-1 8.851 12.24 0.828 3.942 66.36 5.953 6984752.8* 
 (13.06) (24.52) (2.862) (8.986) (204.9) (22.42) (48054697.3) 
        
Party institutionalization-1 314.9* 0.00225 0.00000144 80.07 0.0803 0.0334 1.13032e+11** 
 (877.7) (0.0120) (0.0000139) (344.0) (0.564) (0.363) (1.09445e+12) 
        
Civil society t-1 *Party 
institutionalizationt-1 0.00220
** 0.00148* 0.373 0.00565 0.0000569* 0.00498 2.61e-14** 
 (0.00499) (0.00470) (2.119) (0.0199) (0.000274) (0.0230) (2.52e-13) 
        
Presidential system t-1  0.203 0.618  0.0458 0.121 0.0159 
  (0.365) (0.914)  (0.190) (0.534) (0.121) 
        
Regional democracy 
(Lexical)t-1  0.506 1.070     
  (0.378) (0.930)     
        
Regional democracy (BMR)t-
1     0.499 0.158 0.000000489
** 
     (1.387) (0.531) (0.00000250) 
        
Log(GDP/capita) t-1   0.0575   0.527 0.00703 
   (0.116)   (1.210) (0.0303) 
        
Economic growtht-1   0.980   0.939* 0.796** 
   (0.0796)   (0.0244) (0.0657) 
        
Proportional t-1       643.8*** 
       (583.3) 
        
Fractionalization t-1       2.70e-14* 
       (3.72e-13) 
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Family farmst-1       1.113 
       (0.0612) 
        
Number of observations 932 429 387 849 428 389 357 
Numbers of countries 31 27 24 29 26 23 22 
Number of failures (democratic 
breakdown) 18 14 10 13 11 8 7 
Pseudo R squared 0.283 0.470 0.514 0.319 0.491 0.479 0.680 
Log pseudolikelihood -84.98 -42.99 -27.92 -57.17 -32.13 -23.84 -12.79 
AIC 176.0 95.99 69.85 120.3 74.26 61.67 45.58 
BIC 190.5 116.3 97.56 134.6 94.55 89.42 84.36 
Note: Cox proportional hazard models. Entries are hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses (standard errors adjusted for clusters). The dependent variable (failure variable) is 
democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion.  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A21. Civil Society, Party Institutionalization and Democratic Breakdown, 1918–1939 (Reduced sample Europe and Settler Colonies) (Logit) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Lexical Lexical Lexical Lexical BMR BMR BMR BMR 
Civil Society-1 5.289 8.449+ 6.144* 105578592.5** 3.077 56.21 24.32 24.87 
 (6.911) (9.209) (5.411) (755349143.3) (4.404) (161.7) (73.03) (58.33) 
         
Party Institutionalizationt-1 56.77+ 0.171 0.0613 0.00200 66.44 9.536 8.171 0.000103 
 (132.6) (0.546) (0.140) (0.0136) (170.4) (52.43) (85.11) (0.000946) 
         
Civil society t-1 *Party 
institutionalizationt-1 0.0144
* 0.00607* 0.0173** 2.00e-13** 0.0221 0.0000462 0.000333 0.0000216** 
 (0.0275) (0.0121) (0.0258) (2.24e-12) (0.0479) (0.000279) (0.00156) (0.0000767) 
         
Presidential system t-1  0.221 0.391 0.0151  0.00560 0.0415 0.0112** 
  (0.342) (0.510) (0.0405)  (0.0312) (0.213) (0.0156) 
         
Regional democracy 
(Lexical)t-1  1.100 1.381 1.323     
  (0.365) (0.875) (0.879)     
         
Regional democracy (BMR)t-
1      63.85 3.896 9.628 
      (223.9) (6.337) (68.04) 
         
Log(GDP/capita) t-1   0.226 0.0000223   1.548 6.636 
   (0.428) (0.000126)   (3.308) (16.62) 
         
Economic growtht-1   1.019 1.017   0.915 0.731 
   (0.0976) (0.111)   (0.0856) (0.149) 
         
Proportional t-1    101.9    197.1*** 
    (289.4)    (252.1) 
         
Fractionalization t-1    6.91e-09*    0.00196 
    (6.00e-08)    (0.0103) 
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Family farmst-1    0.897    1.319*** 
    (0.0595)    (0.0742) 
         
t 1.435* 0.731 0.541 10.02 1.894 0.291 0.182 0.372 
 (0.248) (0.433) (0.477) (14.50) (1.098) (0.226) (0.323) (0.952) 
         
t2 0.985* 1.087 1.121 0.998 0.987 1.286* 1.318 1.213 
 (0.00726) (0.0792) (0.123) (0.108) (0.0433) (0.165) (0.242) (0.333) 
         
t3 1.000* 0.997 0.996 0.997 1.000 0.991* 0.990 0.993 
 (0.0000519) (0.00235) (0.00346) (0.00323) (0.00110) (0.00444) (0.00552) (0.00790) 
         
Constant 0.00185*** 0.229 22097.9 8.38885e+33 0.000111* 0.00142* 0.00235 9.72e-12 
 (0.00348) (0.447) (280436.6) (3.60069e+35) (0.000423) (0.00411) (0.0326) (1.29e-10) 
         
Number of observations 953 429 387 356 873 428 389 357 
Numbers of countries 31 27 24 23 29 26 23 22 
Pseudo R squared 0.281 0.356 0.383 0.682 0.336 0.503 0.505 0.699 
Log pseudolikelihood -64.17 -39.70 -28.64 -13.35 -44.91 -25.43 -19.30 -10.36 
AIC 142.3 97.40 79.28 54.71 103.8 68.86 60.59 48.71 
BIC 176.4 134.0 122.8 109.0 137.2 105.4 104.2 103.0 
Note: Dependent variable is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). Logit models. Table entries are odds ratios with robust standard errors clustered by countries in parentheses. t=years of regime 
duration. AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A22. Tables 1 and 2 with Original Maddison, 1918–1939 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Lexical Lexical Lexical Lexical BMR BMR BMR BMR 
Civil societyt-1 0.413* 0.362** 0.239 0.102 0.125** 0.0850* 0.265 64.65 
 (0.145) (0.133) (0.280) (0.135) (0.0869) (0.0968) (1.027) (354.2) 
         
Party institutionalization-1   5.194 19.02   0.0361 0.0305 
   (12.28) (47.64)   (0.332) (0.257) 
         
Civil society t-1 *Party 
institutionalizationt-1   2.322 8.927   0.246 0.0000117 
   (3.509) (14.94)   (1.056) (0.0000720) 
         
Presidential system t-1 3.030 1.921 4.115 1.587 0.770 0.255 0.200 0.108 
 (2.517) (1.927) (4.491) (1.868) (0.952) (1.166) (0.552) (0.551) 
         
Regional democracy 
(Lexical)t-1 1.886
* 2.289 2.166* 4.085**     
 (0.607) (1.427) (0.692) (2.137)     
         
Regional democracy (BMR)t-
1     0.0825 0.0241 0.0591 0.0313 
     (0.122) (0.106) (0.253) (0.170) 
         
Log(GDP/capita) 
(Maddison) t-1 0.0213
*** 0.0112* 0.00560*** 0.000213*** 0.131*** 0.202 0.420 22.68 
 (0.0204) (0.0196) (0.00764) (0.000456) (0.0711) (0.297) (0.918) (64.33) 
         
Economic growth 
(Maddison)t-1 0.982 0.972 0.983 0.984 0.927
** 0.933 0.921*** 0.907 
 (0.0280) (0.0333) (0.0350) (0.0458) (0.0258) (0.0605) (0.0227) (0.0670) 
         
Proportional t-1  2.945  4.153*  3.453  199.2*** 
  (1.803)  (2.409)  (5.621)  (249.8) 
         
Fractionalization t-1  1.041  0.134  0.0429  0.00614 
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  (1.210)  (0.179)  (0.250)  (0.0428) 
         
Family farmst-1  1.008  0.984  1.000  1.081 
  (0.0245)  (0.0200)  (0.0705)  (0.0695) 
         
Number of observations 482 460 470 448 419 395 406 382 
Numbers of countries 34 33 33 32 26 25 25 24 
Number of failures (democratic 
breakdown) 18 17 17 16 10 10 9 9 
Pseudo R squared 0.339 0.378 0.377 0.457 0.486 0.515 0.513 0.609 
Log pseudolikelihood -69.25 -61.16 -61.56 -50.10 -29.30 -27.64 -24.97 -20.04 
AIC 148.5 138.3 137.1 120.2 68.59 71.28 63.93 60.08 
BIC 169.4 171.4 166.2 161.2 88.78 103.1 91.98 99.54 
Note: Cox proportional hazard models. Entries are hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses (standard errors adjusted for clusters). The dependent variable (failure variable) is 
democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). AIC=Akaike Information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion.  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A23. Tables 1 and 2 with Alesina Ethnic Fractionalization, 1918–1939 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Lexical Lexical BMR BMR 
Civil societyt-1 0.469* 0.124 0.0908* 68619977.1 
 (0.138) (0.137) (0.0993) (1.79896e+09) 
     
Party institutionalization-1  3.932  5442.1 
  (8.648)  (122571.5) 
     
Civil society t-1 *Party institutionalizationt-1  8.770  3.12e-15 
  (12.80)  (1.36e-13) 
     
Presidential system t-1 2.090 1.578 0.639 0.00710 
 (2.097) (1.969) (2.221) (0.0687) 
     
Regional democracy (Lexical)t-1 2.282 3.611*   
 (1.342) (1.804)   
     
Regional democracy (BMR)t-1   0.0720 0.231 
   (0.178) (0.966) 
     
Log(GDP/capita) t-1 0.00288** 0.0000931*** 0.264 2.271 
 (0.00631) (0.000182) (0.322) (8.575) 
     
Economic growth t-1 1.011 1.026 0.925 0.915 
 (0.0334) (0.0328) (0.0391) (0.0537) 
     
Proportional t-1 1.871 2.886 3.892 146.6** 
 (1.130) (1.734) (6.157) (281.8) 
     
Fractionalization (Alesina) t-1 0.434 0.0653 0.265 3.85e-08 
 (0.671) (0.105) (1.230) (0.00000110) 
     
Family farmst-1 1.011 0.992 1.015 1.152 
 (0.0232) (0.0207) (0.0442) (0.121) 
     
Number of observations 468 456 399 386 
Numbers of countries 35 34 26 25 
Number of failures (democratic breakdown) 20 19 10 9 
Pseudo R squared 0.376 0.442 0.505 0.626 
Log pseudolikelihood -72.72 -61.63 -28.20 -19.15 
AIC 161.4 143.3 72.40 58.29 
BIC 194.6 184.5 104.3 97.85 
Note: Cox proportional hazard models. Entries are hazard ratios with robust standard errors in parentheses (standard errors adjusted for 
clusters). The dependent variable (failure variable) is democratic breakdown (Lexical or BMR). AIC=Akaike Information criterion; 
BIC=Bayesian information criterion.  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Figures 
Figure A1. Conditional Marginal Effects of Civil Society (t-1) 
  
  
Note: The figures show the conditional marginal effects of civil society on democratic breakdown (BMR) at different levels of Party 
Institutionalization when all other variables are set at their sample mean. 95% confidence intervals.  
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Figure A2. Conditional Marginal Effects of Civil Society (t-1) 
 
Note: The figure shows the conditional marginal effects of civil society on democratic breakdown (Lexical) at different levels of party 
organization when all other variables are set at their sample mean. 95% confidence intervals.  
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Figure A3. Conditional Marginal Effects of Civil Society (t-1) 
 
Note: The figure shows the conditional marginal effects of civil society on democratic breakdown (BMR) at 
different levels of party cohesion when all other variables are set at their sample mean. 95% confidence intervals.  
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Figure A4. Conditional Marginal Effects of Civil Society (t-1) (Reduced Sample) 
  
  
Note: The figure shows the conditional marginal effects of civil society on democratic breakdown (Lexical) at different levels of party 
institutionalization when all other variables are set at their sample mean. 95% confidence intervals.  
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Figure A5. Conditional Marginal Effects of Civil Society (t-1) (Reduced Sample) 
 
Note: The figure shows the conditional marginal effects of civil society on democratic breakdown (BMR) at 
different levels of party institutionalization when all other variables are set at their sample mean. 95% confidence 
intervals.  
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Online Appendix 2.  
Civil Society Strength: CSO Participatory Environment (V-Dem Codebook 5.5, p. 232) 
12.6 CSO participatory environment (C) (v2csprtcpt, *_osp, *_ord)  
Project manager: Michael Bernhard  
Question: Which of these best describes the involvement of people in civil society organizations 
(CSOs)?  
Responses:  
0: Most associations are state-sponsored, and although a large number of people may be active in 
them, their participation is not purely voluntary.  
1: Voluntary CSOs exist but few people are active in them.  
2: There are many diverse CSOs, but popular involvement is minimal.  
3: There are many diverse CSOs and it is considered normal for people to be at least occasionally 
active in at least one of them.  
Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, 
posted at V-Dem.net).  
Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.  
Party Institutionalization: Party Institutionalization Index (V-Dem Codebook v.5.5, p. 60) 
2.18 Party system institutionalization index (D) (v2xps_party)  
Project manager: Allen Hicken  
Question: To what extent are political parties institutionalized?  
Clarifications: Party system institutionalization refers to various attributes of the political parties in a 
country, e.g., level and depth of organization, links to civil society, cadres of party activists, party 
supporters within the electorate, coherence of party platforms and ideologies, party-line voting among 
representatives within the legislature. A high score on these attributes generally indicates a more 
institutionalized party system. This index considers the attributes of all parties with an emphasis on 
larger parties, i.e., those that may be said to dominate and define the party system.  
Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model 
of the indicators for party organizations (v2psorgs), party branches (v2psprbrch), party linkages 
(v2psprlnks), distinct party platforms (v2psplats), and legislative party cohesion (v2pscohesv).  
Scale: Interval  
Sources: v2psorgs v2psprbrch v2psprlnks v2psplats v2pscohesv  
Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.  
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The Components of Party Institutionalization (V-Dem Codebook v.5.5 pp. 120–123) 
4.6 Party organizations (C) (v2psorgs, *_osp, *_ord) (pp. 120–121) 
Project manager: Allen Hicken  
Question: How many political parties for national-level office have permanent organizations?  
Clarification: A permanent organization connotes a substantial number of personnel who are 
responsible for carrying out party activities outside of the election season.  
Responses:  
0: No parties.  
1: Fewer than half of the parties.  
2: About half of the parties.  
3: More than half of the parties.  
4: All parties.  
Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, 
posted at V-Dem.net). 121  
Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 
 
4.7 Party branches (C) (v2psprbrch, *_osp, *_ord) (p. 121) 
Project manager: Allen Hicken  
Question: How many parties have permanent local party branches?  
Responses:  
0: None.  
1: Fewer than half.  
2: About half.  
3: More than half.  
4: All.  
Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, 
posted at V-Dem.net).  
Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 
 
4.8 Party linkages (C) (v2psprlnks, *_osp, *_ord) (p. 121) 
Project manager: Allen Hicken  
Question: Among the major parties, what is the main or most common form of linkage to their 
constituents?  
Clarification: A party-constituent linkage refers to the sort of “good” that the party offers in exchange 
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for political support and participation in party activities.  
Responses:  
0: Clientelistic. Constituents are rewarded with goods, cash, and/or jobs.  
1: Mixed clientelistic and local collective.  
2: Local collective. Constituents are rewarded with local collective goods, e.g., wells, toilets, markets, 
roads, bridges, and local development.  
3: Mixed local collective and policy/programmatic.  
4: Policy/programmatic. Constituents respond to a party’s positions on national policies, general party 
programs, and visions for society.  
Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, 
posted at V-Dem.net).  
Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 
 
4.9 Distinct party platforms (C) (v2psplats, *_osp, *_ord) (p. 122) 
Project manager: Allen Hicken  
Question: How many political parties with representation in the national legislature or presidency have 
publicly available party platforms (manifestos) that are publicized and relatively distinct from one 
another?  
Clarification: In order to be counted in the affirmative, parties must have platforms that are both 
distinct (either in terms of content or generalized ideology) and publicly disseminated.  
This question is not intended to measure how much the public actually knows about these platforms 
or whether they are important in structuring policymaking.  
Responses:  
0: None, or nearly none.  
1: Fewer than half.  
2: About half.  
3: More than half.  
4: All, or nearly all.  
Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, 
posted at V-Dem.net).  
Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.  
 
4.11 Legislative party cohesion (C) (v2pscohesv, *_osp, *_ord) (p. 123) 
 
 
81 
Project manager: Allen Hicken  
Question: Is it normal for members of the legislature to vote with other members of their party on 
important bills?  
Responses:  
0: Not really. Many members are elected as independents and party discipline is very weak.  
1: More often than not. Members are more likely to vote with their parties than against them, but 
defections are common.  
2: Mostly. Members vote with their parties most of the time.  
3: Yes, absolutely. Members vote with their parties almost all the time.  
Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, 
posted at V-Dem.net).  
Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 
 
 
